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WITHOUT NARRATIVE: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Lynne Henderson*
The more painful, dramatic, and overwhelming the narrative, the
more tense, wary, and self-protective is the audience, the quicker
the instinct to withdraw. '
I. INTRODUCTION
Feminists have been rewriting the stories of harms to women in law
for some time now, drawing on the experiences of women, as well as nu-
merous empirical studies, to define and expand understanding of the
harms created by sexual violence and exploitation.2 But as feminists may
suspect from their experiences with rape law and law reform efforts, the
criminal law continues to disadvantage the relatively powerless and per-
petuate the dominant ideologies of the powerful. Resistance to effective
change and to understanding sexualized violence exists even when strong
* Professor of Law, Indiana University--Bloomington. I thank Linda Alis, Donna Coker,
Mary Coombs, Donald Ehrman, Karla Fischer, Jaqueline MacCauley, Manie Mahoney,
Aviva Orenstein, Michael Wald, Catharine Wells, Robin West, Susan Williams, Stephanie
Wildman, and Robert Weisberg, for discussing aspects of this paper and for their encour-
agement, interest, and helpful comments. I also benefited from comments on presentations
at the Northwestern Feminist Symposium in 1994, the Law & Society Association 1995
Annual Meeting, and a Stanford faculty works-in-progress luncheon. Special thanks also to
Indiana University School of Law for providing summer research support and Paul Lomio
of the Stanford Law Library for his "typical," yet extraordinary, assistance. For other very
special and appreciated support, many thanks to Alan Lagod, Marnie Mahoney, Susan Sig-
norella, and Robert Weisberg. All errors are mine alone.
I Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies 20 (1991). I thank Carol Sanger for intro-
ducing me to Langer's work.
2 The literature on sexual violence is now voluminous. See generally, Law and Violence
Against Women (Mary Louise Fellows & Beverly Balos eds., 1994); Catharine MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified (1987); Diana Russell, Rape in Marriage (1990); Diana Russell, The
Politics of Rape: The Victim's Perspective (1975); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Mar-
gins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L.
Rev. 1241 (1991); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087 (1986); Robin West, The Differ-
ence in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3
Wis. Women's L.J. 81 (1987) [hereinafter The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives].
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voices and numerous empirical studies prove the widespread existence of
the violence and the harms it causes. When such voices and studies do not
exist, this resistance becomes almost insurmountable. This Essay explores
the resistance to confronting child sexual abuse as one such example.
In 1989, Robin West argued that scholarly fascination with Foucault's
theories of power had led critical scholars to render unproblematic the ex-
ercise of sexual power over females.3 In that critique, she noted a glaring
omission and, accordingly, a mischaracterization, in Foucault's telling of
an event in The History of Sexuality.4 Foucault's story of a village "half-
wit" who "fondled" a young girl--used by Foucault to illustrate the de-
ployment of state, medical, and social power to create a "discourse" of
sexuality-portrays the event as benign and pleasurable rather than abu-
sive or frightening: the discursive powers of medicine and the state
"assembled around these timeless gestures, these barely furtive pleasures
between simple-minded adults and alert children, a whole machinery for
speechifying, analyzing, and investigating." 5 As West observed, "[w]ith
all the attention given to 'discourses,' neither the French officials, nor
Foucault himself, nor the vast majority of social and legal critics he has
influenced, have yet heard a word from the child who was molested
.... .6 West points out that "[i]f we had listened, analyzed, and speechi-
fied the experience -of the alert child,"' 7 rather than having her remain in
silence, we might have encountered something entirely different: "we
might have had an account of 'furtive violence' to analyze, categorize,
speechify, medicalize, theologize, philosophize, psychologize and agonize
over, rather than an account of 'furtive pleasure. '8
Child sexual abuse is a form of furtive violence committed against
vulnerable individuals. Most of us deplore this violence, but at the same
time, paradoxically deny that it is much of a problem or issue. It is a sub-
ject that is enormously difficult to address, on both an emotional and a
3 Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 59, 74-
75 (1989).
4 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
5 West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, supra note 3, at 73 (quoting Foucault,
I The History of Sexuality 31-32 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978)).
6 Id. at 74.
7 Id. at 75.
8 Id. at 76.
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cognitive level. Awareness of the existence of sexual abuse of children is
too painful and too threatening to encounter unmediated; hence, fully un-
derstandable responses include shrinking away from thinking about it,
explaining it away, or flatly denying its existence.9 Unlike most victims of
other sexualized violence, the victims of child sexual abuse have had little
or no voice, creating a literal as well as figurative absence of narrative
about the harm. An unwilling or unreceptive audience for the voices that
have spoken compounds the difficulty of developing narratives and in-
formation that might lead to better understanding of, and responses to,
abuse.
This Essay assumes that child sexual abuse exists, that it can be enor-
mously harmful to those who suffer it, and that we have committed moral
and epistemological errors in shrinking from examining its reality. By
sexual abuse, I mean everything ranging from rape to statutory rape to
oral and anal contact to genital touching-"fondling" is an inapposite
word-to masturbation in the presence of a child to sexualized kissing to
spying, leering, and suggesting. The title of this Essay, "Without Narra-
tive," seeks to capture the very real problem of communication and defi-
nition of what "counts" and what does not "count" as knowledge. The
subject of child sexual abuse provides a context in which no explicit, sta-
ble narratives exist to support knowledge about, and interpretation of, a
crime. This Essay explores what happens when no "official" story (or sto-
ries) exists, and the effects of a literal absence of narrative of violence and
harm in law.
By narrative, I mean two things, neither of which necessarily entails
the current debates over "narrative" or "voice" in legal scholarship.10
9 A number of people with whom I have spoken have indicated discomfort with the sub-
ject, with some denying its potential prevalence, some cautioning me against writing on the
subject, some immediately shifting the subject, and others bringing up "false allegation"
stories. Still others have said it was too depressing a subject.
10 The law reviews have been full of arguments about the merits or demerits of "voice,"
"storytelling," and "narrative" in terms of whether these are valuable as scholarship, legal
analysis, or knowledge. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L.
Rev. 971 (1991); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Mat-
ter?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 95 (1990); Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-
Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 Geo. L.J. 1845
(1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807 (1993). My concern is to demonstrate what happens
when no organized knowledge has been gathered prior to encountering the legal system, and
1997]
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Rather, "narrative" refers here to the story necessary to develop a legal
case and to the story's role in communicating and making the world com-
prehensible. When I first started trying cases as a district attorney, I na-
ively assumed that if I could prove each element of a crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and add them up for the jury, the jury would convict. It
took one hung jury to disabuse me of that notion--the jury needed a story
linking the elements to make the guilt of the defendant comprehensible.
From then on, as both a prosecutor and a defense attorney, I approached
the evidence in each case in part to develop a story to tell other attorneys,
judges, and juries. I also learned that when trial lawyers ask "what's the
theory of the case?," they do not mean the abstract theory of law or juris-
prudence that applies, but the narrative approach, the story that the lawyer
develops to "tell" the judge or jury."1 (Of course, surprises in a trial can
mean massive revisions in the script, but that is another problem.) Telling
the story requires having witnesses who can articulate the facts within the
narrative, both on and off the witness stand. To have a story requires
having witnesses who can help to tell the story in terms of the "facts," and,
even if the evidence is not presented in a linear form, the ultimate narra-
tive must be linear. Stories can vary in complexity and novelty, but they
are often linked in common "formats" or plots, particularly in criminal
law. The criminal trial is a morality play, good versus evil.' 2
when no articulate witnesses exist. That is, I am using "narrative" to capture the conven-
tions-or lack of them--that structure thinking about the subject of child sexual abuse.
11 See Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1984), for an excellent arti-
cle that develops the notion of using "stock stories" drawn from cultural understandings in
relation to lawyering. Kathryn Abrams writes:
For the trial attorney, law is inevitably about presenting concrete and
nonlinear stories, about sensing the features of a narrative that will en-
gage a judge's or juror's attention .... Using and telling clients' stories
requires trial lawyers to make constant assessments of what they mean,
of what elements unite them, of which features are most important.
Abrams, supra note 10, at 1043. But those stories must fit within recognizable formats and
understandings, and may depend on popular culture or subculture, as well as abstract cate-
gories of narrative such as romance, tragedy, comedy, and irony. The stories generally must
not be too outlandish or counter-intuitive to succeed. Moreover, certain formatted stories
are generalized to certain categories of cases. In criminal law, for example, there is the re-
curring tale of the jealous husband/lover/spouse in homicide, vindictive or provocative
woman in rape, and so on.
12 For a development of the archetypal themes of narrative in literature, see Northrop Frye,
Anatomy of Criticism (1957). For an application of Frye's structure of narratives to juris-
prudential/legal approaches, see Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative-. Ana Aesthetic
Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 145 (1985).
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Second, narrative is important to epistemological questions. I base my
claim about the epistemological role of narrative on research about how
we organize cognitions about events, including how we interpret the dis-
parate data of life and organize "memory.' 3 Narrative provides individu-
als with cognitive and schematic frameworks for organizing, interpreting,
and expressing their experiences both internally and to others. Narrative
patterns construct categories, events, and associations among events, de-
termining what is accepted as "true" and "untrue" (whether inaccurate,
mistaken, or just plain "false") by imposing a meaning on those events.
The explanatory, connective, and gap-filling capabilities of narrative en-
able us to determine our responses, adding to a sense of predictability and
control over our environment, as well as providing us with the signs,
symbols, and storylines to use in communicating with others. Narrative's
cultural role provides a communicative bridge between the collective and
the individual by providing an intelligible manner of recounting events.
These stories of how the world works, based on pre-existing understand-
ings, in turn affect memory.
For a discussion of narrative meaning in the context of a criminal trial and stories about
it, drawing on conventional and "postmodem" views of storytelling, see Richard K. Sher-
win, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 39 (1994) (discussing the interpretation of "facts" in the trial of Randall Dale Adams
and in the movie The Thin Blue Line, and concluding that a shared cultural story line creates
meaning out of disparate facts). See also Vicki Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide:
Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 507 (1993) (arguing that jurors have pre-
existing understandings of what narratives constitute a crime, and that the impact of this prior
knowledge can be minimized by altering these understandings). Of course, in a pinch, the defense
lawyer resorts to the "reasonable doubt" plot, which involves a kind of un-self-conscious
"deconstruction" of the prosecution's evidence, developing alternative stories for each piece of
incriminating evidence and a story of why the jury should find reasonable doubt Attorneys often
place the reasonable doubt story in the context of national myths about presumptions of innocence
and suspicion of the state.
13 For an introduction to the role of narrative in cognition, see Steven L. Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 Mich.
L. Rev. 2225, 2230-55, 2271-79 (1989). Winter, however, treats narratives as a kind of
gloss on more "fundamental" or basic (posited) cognitive structures, such as schema and
metaphor. See id. at 2230-32. He treats what he terms "Idealized Cognitive Models"--
scripts, "stock stories," and "folk tales"--as independent mediators between cognition and
narrative; I treat stock stories, folk tales, and scripts as narratives for the purpose of this
discussion. Moreover, narrative has not only a cognitive function in the simple sense of
mental processes, but also an emotive function---schemata, scripts, and stock stories tend to
carry emotional valence with them as well.
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Although some commentators have made much of the distinction
between "narrative truth" and "historical" or "factual" truth, 14 the two are
not so easily separated: facts influence narrative, but narrative also influ-
ences what is seen as "fact"--those things observed that "fit" a story and
those that are not observed or are discarded that don't fit or don't "make
sense" within the context of a cultural narrative or myth. For example, as
Lucie White has demonstrated in Rethinking Welfare Dependency,15 the
myth reinforcing the notion that welfare causes poverty is entrenched in
our national discourse. We screen the "facts" about the history of welfare,
and the lives of people on it, against the context of this myth and its sup-
porting cast of stories (anyone who wants to get a job, or education, or
man can; people on welfare are lazy or promiscuous). Accordingly, the
"welfare reinforces poverty" story overlooks or elides many relevant
"facts" of the reality of welfare in the United States.' 6 At the same time,
history and memory are enhanced by pre-existing stories, and an individ-
ual's memory can be more accurate, even if the precise "fact" did not oc-
cur.17 That is, encoding events in an individual's memory is not only hin-
dered, but, at times, helped by pre-existing knowledge, experience, and
narrative or schematic frames.
14 Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past 104-12
(1996); Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60
Wash. L. Rev. 331, 331 (1985) (defining "historical truth" as "the question of what really
happened in the world"). See also Richard K. Sherwin, supra note 12 (explaining the inter-
action of "facts" with "storytelling"). Historians, for example, often are aware that they
construct narratives about the historical "facts" they write about. Statement of Judith A.
Allen, Director, Women's Studies Program, Prof. of History and Women's Studies, Indiana
University-Bloomington, Feb. 10, 1997, Feminist Theory Reading Group meeting.
15 Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different Ground,
81 Geo. L.J. 1961 (1993).
16 See Kathleen A. Kost and Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the
Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y
& L. 3 (1996); Donna Asher Vandegrift, The "Typical" Welfare Recipient: Myth and Real-
ity, 3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 343 (1996).
17 See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 14, at 102. For example, Schacter relates an experiment
in which information given to subjects about a baseball game was misremembered by base-
ball experts, who filled in a narrative gap because the fact not provided was essential to the
outcome. Those who did not know baseball did not "misremember" what they were told.
Assuming the event happened, would the experts have been "wrong" or telling a false story?
Or would they be more accurate historically? Schacter calls them "victims of their own
extensive knowledge about baseball, which infiltrated their encoding of the story," yet the
story could not have been "true" without the missing fact they supplied. Id.
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This Essay is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject or the law,
nor is this account of difficulties of proof and legal failure the only possi-
ble one. Nevertheless, narrative failure is, I believe, an important part of
the problems we currently face in this area. By exploring the issue in the
context of a particular case involving vast areas of epistemological uncer-
tainty within a climate of increased hostility to allegations of child sexual
abuse, this Essay seeks to explore one way in which law and society have
failed to make any particular progress in understanding or coping with the
crime. I argue that unless we have narratives in which to situate evalua-
tions of child sexual abuse, we have little legal or social power to do any-
thing about it.
I chose the example of child sexual abuse because of my own per-
sonal experiences of and with the crime, and because it exemplifies the
tensions in what we know and don't know, morally condemn and
morally condone. Because there is currently no settled narrative
framework in which to understand child sexual abuse, the subject is
difficult to apprehend; it eludes meaning and vanishes almost as soon
as it surfaces. And because the absence of narrative understandings
requires an oblique approach to the subject, existing structures of
"proof' and evidence in law are almost completely inadequate to
dealing with the crime, leading to further denial of the existence of the
harm. Accordingly, the purpose of this Essay is twofold: to examine
the difficulties of proving a particular crime and to examine the role
that narrative has played in shaping and maintaining these difficulties.
This Essay begins with a short summary of the background of the
emergence and disappearance of child sexual abuse as a legal and social
problem. It then relates the "story" of an actual case in which I was in-
volved, a case that raises a number of issues, but which I am using here to
illustrate the epistemological and moral issues currently pervading the
topic of child sexual abuse. The Essay then examines some of the ques-
tions raised by this particular case under existing legal and social-scientific
assumptions of what constitutes "proof' and the interplay between narra-
tive and proof. This Essay argues that if there is no way to tell the story of
sexual abuse of children, then there cannot be any way to respond. I con-
clude that it is incumbent upon us to continue efforts to develop narratives
of, as well as other means to apprehend, abuse.
4851997]
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II. BACKGROUND
Primarily a hidden crime, child sexual abuse had long been considered
rare and of minor import.' 8 Largely as a result of feminist consciousness-
raising and increased awareness of sexual violence, concern about the ex-
tent and nature of such abuse has grown in legal circles, in the media, and
in public consciousness in the United States over the past two decades.
From an emerging story of the extent and harm caused by sexual abuse of
children, particularly girls, beginning in the late 1970s,19 to a flurry of le-
gal activity, including law reform,20 Supreme Court Confrontation Clause
decisions,21 and highly-publicized prosecutions by the late 1980s, 22 atten-
tion has now turned to stories of disastrous prosecutions, 23 wronged par-
1 See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
19 Jon R. Conte, Child Sexual Abuse: Awareness and Backlash, 4 The Future of Children
224, 224 (1994).
20 Much of the law reform activity appears to have involved enacting mandatory reporting
laws and extending statutes of limitations in both criminal and tort cases involving child
sexual abuse. See Seth C. Kalichman, Mandated Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse: Eth-
ics, Law, and Policy 9-39 (1993); Donna M. Pence & Charles A. Wilson, Reporting and
Investigating Child Sexual Abuse, 4 The Future of Children 70, 70-71 (1994). See also infra
note 199 (statutes of limitations).
21 See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (finding no Confrontation Clause
violation where a closed circuit television was used to protect an alleged six-year-old sexual
abuse victim from viewing the defendant); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (holding
that the out of court statements of a two-and-a-half-year-old alleged child abuse victim to a
pediatrician violated the Confrontation Clause and were inadmissible as hearsay); Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that an Appellant's Confrontation Clause right to face-
to-face confrontation was violated when a screen was placed between him and two 13-year-
old girls whom he allegedly sexually abused when they testified at trial). See also White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not require
"unavailability" for admission of a four-year-old child's statements to mother, babysitter,
police officer, nurse, and doctor).
22 The most "infamous" cases include the Jordan (Minnesota) Pre-School case, the
McMartin trial, and the Kelly Michaels trial. See Billie W. Dziech & Charles B. Schudson,
On Trial: America's Courts and Their Treatment of Sexually Abused Children 73-81 (1989)
(discussing the Jordan and McMartin Cases); John Crewdson, By Silence Betrayed: Sexual
Abuse of Children in America 132-158 (1988) (McMartin); James R. Kincaid, Child Lov-
ing: The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture 341-58 (1992) (McMartin). See also Ronald
Smothers, In a Day-Care Case New Questions, Few Answers, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1993, at
B7 ("Little Rascals" case); Nancy Hass, Margaret Kelly Michaels Wants Her Innocence
Back, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1995, (Magazine), at 37-41 (Michaels suing "virtually every
individual involved" in her prosecution).
23 See, e.g., Lawrence Wright, Child-Care Demons, The New Yorker, Oct. 3, 1994, at 5-6;
Dziech & Schudson, supra note 22, at 73-78, 182-87; Crewdson, supra note 22, at 132-58.
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ents, 24 "false" accusations,25 and to an attack on the credibility and believ-
ability of both children and adults claiming abuse.26 While the public de-
bate is currently raging over "recovered," "repressed," or "false" memory
in adults,27 that debate has become conflated with, and seriously affects,
questions of the ability of children to recall or recount abuse.28 Further,
the "false memory" debate has deflected attention from the reality of child
abuse, allowing us to avoid acknowledging that reality and the questions
of moral responsibility that it raises.
Historically, we know little about how much concern existed about the
sexual use of children by adults. Indeed, some have argued that the con-
cept of "childhood" itself did not exist until late in human history, so that
it might not have even occurred to people to consider children "different"
sexually.2 9 By the Victorian era, however, sexual differentiation and dis-
tinction of children from adults had certainly emerged in western Euro-
pean culture.30 In nineteenth century England and the United States, as a
clear distinction between childhood and adulthood took hold, concern
with sexual exploitation of at least some, if not all, females developed. For
example, legislatures enacted statutory rape laws throughout the nine-
For a study of the rise of, and changes in, media coverage, which documents initial report-
ing as being devoted to the need to understand the phenomenon and to raise consciousness
to stories of "false accusations" and "false memories," see Katherine Beckett, Culture and
the Politics of Signification: The Case of Child Sexual Abuse, 43 Social Problems 57
(1996).
24 Laura Shapiro et al., Rush to Judgment, Newsweek, April 19, 1993, at 54-60; Maria A.
Gaura, Family and Children's Services Under Fire, S.F. Chron., July 15, 1993, at Al 7.
25 Shapiro et al., supra note 24, at 58-60; Children Make Up Tale of Teacher's Sex Abuse,
S.F. Chron., May 18, 1994, at A7 (fourth graders falsely claimed teacher fondled them).
26 See infra notes 134-58 and accompanying text.
27 Elizabeth Loftus & Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memo-
ries and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (1994); Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A
Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 551, 597-615 (1996); D. Stephen Lindsay & J. Don Read, Psychotherapy and Memo-
ries of Childhood Sexual Abuse: A Cognitive Perspective, 8 Applied Cognitive Psych. 281
(1994).
28 This slippage appears in Loftus & Ketcham, supra note 27, at 95-139 ("planting" "false
memories" in children and adolescents to argue that therapists can create false memories of
abuse). Schacter also discusses "false memory" in children and adults in sexual abuse cases.
See Schacter, supra note 14, at 124-33 (discussing the Michaels and Ingram cases).
29 Crewdson, supra note 22, at 35-36; Beckett, supra note 23, at 71-74.
30 Crewdson, supra note 22, at 35-36.
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teenth century.31 One primary purpose of these statutory rape laws un-
doubtedly was to protect a property-like interest in a girl's "chastity" and
marriageability, 32 but the laws also received support from Victorian
feminists in order to protect girls from, and to condemn as wrong, sexual
abuse and exploitation.33 The protection was selective, however: in the
United States, at least, the statutory rape laws did not protect young Afri-
can American girls from exploitation and abuse,34 nor did these laws pro-
tect boys from heterosexual abuse.35
Freud's late nineteenth century "discovery" of the effects of sexual
abuse on his patients disappeared almost as soon as he asserted it.36 While
there are several explanations for his decision not to pursue his investiga-
tion of the seduction theory, it is clear that his thesis was not well-received
by the medical community.37 Freud's move away from the seduction the-
ory led him instead to attribute an adult vision of sexuality to children in
his Oedipal theory, which relegated much of adult-child sexual interaction
to the realm of childish fantasy.38 Thus, the issue of sexual use and abuse
31 Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape
Law, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 15, 27-28 (1994); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A
Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 402-04 (1984).
32 Oberman, supra note 31, at 25.
33 Id. at 27. See also John D'Enilio & Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History
of Sexuality in America 152-54 (1988) (describing the Women's Christian Temperance
Union campaign to raise the age of consent to prevent coercion of young women into prosti-
tution.
34 See, e.g., bell hooks, Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, in Law and Vio-
lence Against Women 357, 359 (Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1994). The
social purity campaign emphasized "whiteness," D'Emilio & Freedman, supra note 33, at
153, and blacks were considered fallen or different. Id. at 187.
35 Rather, the laws were gender-specific. See Oberman, supra note 31, at 25; Olsen, supra
note 31, at 404-06. Perhaps anti-sodomy laws could be said to have protected boys from
abuse by other males.
36 Crewdson, supra note 22, at 36-41.
37 See, e.g., Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery 13-20 (1992); Crewdson, supra
note 22, at 36-41; Schacter, supra note 14, at 100; Bowman & Mertz, supra note 27, at 615-
18.
38 Jeffrey Masson, The Assault On Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory
107-44 (1988); but see Leonard Shengold, M.D., Soul Murder, 15-16, 32-40 (1989)
(defending Freud and criticizing Masson); Bowman & Mertz, supra note 27, at 615-18.
Alice Miller, Thou Shalt Not Be Aware: Society's Betrayal of the Child 107-18 (1986)
(Hildegarde & Hander Hannum trans.).
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of children faded from concern. Certainly, the orthodox psychoanalytic
tradition has held that patients' reports of sexual abuse memories, particu-
larly those of females, are "fantasies. ' 39 Even the most charitable analysts
would only say that if the patient believed it had occurred and was
hanned, then there was harm.40 Even today, a distinguished researcher
and writer on memory comfortably supports Freud's abandonment of the
theory by pointing to the lack of "corroboration" of the sexual abuse re-
counted by his patients, indicating continuing discomfort with the original
thesis. 41
In the 1950's, S.K. Weinberg's study of incest estimated that the
number of English-speaking children victimized was tiny, one in every
million.42 The therapeutic and medical establishments agreed that the rate
of incest and other child sexual abuse was low. Anthropological assertions
of the universality of the "incest taboo" reinforced the belief that intra-
familial sexual abuse of children simply was not a serious problem. 43 In
addition, anthropological studies of sexual activity with or between young
adolescents in other cultures tended to be romanticized and celebrated by
Western readers as free, erotic, exotic, and non-repressive. 44 The conven-
tional "wisdom" was that few, if any, of those children who were in fact
sexually abused were actually harmed.45 This remains the wisdom today
to some extent.46 Even the immorality of sexualized use of children con-
tinues to be contested-if a girl child is "willing," "seductive," a "Lolita,"
39 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, supra note 37, at 19.
40 Shengold, supra note 38, at 38 (The assumption, "common ... among practicing psy-
choanalysts-that it does make a difference whether something actually happened, but that
this does not deny the pathogenic power of fantasy.").
41 Schacter, supra note 14, at 274.
42 Crewdson, supra note 22, at 25. Kinsey had reported a rate of nearly 25% of respon-
dents in his study of females. Id. See also Jeffrey J. Haugaard & N. Dickon Reppucci, The
Sexual Abuse of Children: A Comprehensive Guide to Current Knowledge and Intervention
Strategies 32 (1988).
43 Crewdson, supra note 22, at 34-35; Diana E.H. Russell, The Secret Trauma: Incest in
the Lives of Girls and Women 8-9 (1986).
44 Margaret Mead's Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth
for Western Civilization (1961), was one such example used to say if only "we weren't so
repressive" when I was a teenager.
45 See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text; Russell, supra note 43, at 8-9.
46 Kinsey concurred that there was little harm done to girls, as did Karl Menninger. Dziech
& Schudson, supra note 22, at 7-8.
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or, in some cultures, an economic drain, then the use of her body and
mind by an adult or older adolescent is seen as perfectly permissible, or at
least not harmful.47
In the United States, cultural beliefs about child sexual abuse appear to
rest on a handful of persistent stereotypes. Sexual predation by strangers
or psychopaths who kidnap and kill remains a feared stereotype. Only
strangers in cars lurking around schoolyards, who are themselves at times
"comic" figures such as Chester the Molester, a cartoon character in Hus-
tler magazine, abuse children. Perhaps as a part of a tendency to project a
negative sexuality onto others, members of the dominant culture may
consider members of "outsider" groups--gays and lesbians, Roman
Catholic priests--to be likely child sexual abusers. Part of the stereotype
contained in homophobia, for example, is that gay men are pedophiles;48
incest as a problem of intra-family sexual abuse is associated with stereo-
types of Kentucky hill people and other marginal (and poor) groups. 49
A comfortable belief persists that only "pedophiles"-a tiny number
of sexual deviants-abuse children sexually.5 0 Of course, one cultural
47 Margaret A. Healy, Prosecuting the Child Sex Tourists at Home: Do Laws in Sweden,
Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children as Mandated by Interna-
tional Law?, 18 Fordham L.J. 1852, 1869-70 (1995); Patricia D. Levan, Curtailing Thai-
land's Child Prostitution Through an International Conscience, 9 Am. U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol'y
869, 874 (1994); Marlise Simons, The Sexual Market: Scourge on the World's Children,
N.Y. Times, April 9, 1993, at A3.
48 Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic
Violence, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 335, 354 (1995). This stereotype appeared in arguments sup-
porting the Georgia sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 U.S. 2841 (1986). Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574, 1641-49 (1987).
49 Noel McKibbin, Defending Sexual Molestation Claims Under a Comprehensive General
Liability Policy: Issues of Scope, Occurrence, and Expert Witness Testimony, 39 Drake L.
Rev. 477, 508 n. 109 (1989/1990). As an example of how stereotyping works, the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation's (FMSF) founder claims that there are two "methods" to
demonstrate that the organization does not represent pedophiles: "'We are a good looking
bunch of people: graying hair, well-dressed, healthy, smiling .... Just about every person
... is someone you would likely find interesting and want to count as a friend."' Kenneth S.
Pope, Memory, Abuse, and Science: Questioning Claims About the False Memory Syn-
drome Epidemic, 51 Am. Psychol. 957, 960 (1996) (quoting FMSF executive director
Pamela Freyd). The implication is that "normal" appearing people (white, upper-middle
class, educated) never molest children.
50 Joseph R. Long, II, N.V. v. Moraine Mutual Insurance Co.: The Liability Insurance
Intentional Injury Exclusion in Cases of Child Sexual Abuse, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 139, 156
(1991).
490
Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse
stereotype of "pedophiles" emphasizes that they are men who prey on
boys, not girls. The absence of concern for females ought to give one
pause. In fact, cultural images of little girls speak of them "flirting" or
"being seductive." The popular image portrayed in Nabokov's Lolita5 1
gave cultural permission to sexual contact with young adolescent girls as
part of a narrative of female sexuality. On the other hand, in our culture,
for a male to exploit a young male sexually is seen as horrific at all times;
female sexual exploitation of young males is often portrayed in narratives
of rites of passage or humor, depending on the circumstances. Thus, the
movies Summer of '4252 and The Graduate53 seemingly approve of a
boy's and a young man's "sexual initiation" by an attractive older woman;
more recently, Spanking the Monkey,54 a film about mother-son incest,
was highly regarded by critics, who portrayed it as comedic, failing to
scrutinize the film for any message of exploitative and damaging sexual-
ity.55 At the same time, however, Freudian theory considers actual sexual
abuse of boys by their mothers particularly horrific and damaging.56
If one were to search the literature on child sexual abuse and incest-
even during the 1980's-one would find a relative paucity of studies in
academic books and journals.57 Therefore, to find information about or
help on the questions raised by the "discovery" of the reality of child sex-
ual abuse throughout the 1980s, one had to turn to a growing literature
produced by women for women about sexual abuse. 58 As feminist con-
sciousness-raising had done in uncovering and articulating experiences of
rape and sexual harassment through women's personal stories, so, too, did
51 Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita (Vintage Books 1989) (1955).
52 Summer of'42 (Warner Bros. 1971).
53 The Graduate (Embassy 1967).
54 Spanking the Monkey (Fine Line 1994).
55 See, e.g., John Hart, Highlights, Lowlights, Seattle Times, Dec. 25, 1994, at K1; Mi-
chael Blowen, 'Monkey' Has a Quirky Humor, Boston Globe, Dec. 16, 1994, at 70; Caryn
James, 'Spanking' Triumphs, Despite Lurid Elements, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 10, 1994, at
D5.
56 See Shengold, supra note 38, at 155-80.
57 Rare exceptions include Judith Lewis Herman's Father-Daughter Incest (1981) and
David Finkelhor's Sexually Victimized Children (1979) and Child Sexual Abuse, New The-
ory and Research (1984).
58 See, e.g., I Never Told Anyone: Writings by Women Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse
(Ellen Bass & Louise Thornton eds., 1983), and infra notes 59, 60, and 63.
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this literature rely on those narratives. For example, Louise Armstrong's
Kiss Daddy Goodnight,59 published in 1978, is organized around inter-
views and stories of incest survivors; Toni McNaron and Yarrow Mor-
gan's Voices in the Night,60 published in 1982, contains essays, poems,
journal entries, and so on, which grew out of the authors' consciousness-
raising and participation in a lesbian writers' group. 61 Much of this litera-
ture speaks in voices not recognized by dominant epistemological or
"scientific" models of what is true and how we know it to be true, and
therefore, it is vulnerable to attacks on grounds of credibility, believabil-
ity, memory, and bias.62 The Courage to Heal,63 a handbook for women
sexually abused as children, contains stories, poems, letters, and essays by
women discussing the issues faced by female sexual abuse survivors.64
Many have vilified the book as dangerous and unscientific, and its authors
have not only been targeted for relentless criticism, but have also been
sued for fomenting "false" memories and "false" accusations. 65
As with narratives of Holocaust survivors, personal narratives of sex-
ual abuse are too unbearable for most listeners and readers to believe. But,
unlike those of Holocaust survivors, the stories of survivors of child sex-
ual abuse often do not have "independent" evidence of the existence of
terrible facts: "corroboration" is difficult, if not impossible, to provide.
Sexual abusers, unlike the Nazis, do not often keep careful documentation
or extensive film records of their crimes. 66 In many instances, "objective"
59 Louise Armstrong, Kiss Daddy Goodnight (1978).
60 Voices in the Night (Toni A.H. McNaron & Yarrow Morgan eds., 1982).
61 Id. at 11-19.
62 Ofshe and Watters label some of this literature "pseudoscience." Richard Ofshe and
Ethan Watters, Making Monsters: False Memories, Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria 65-
81(1994).
63 Ellen Bass & Laura Davis, The Courage to Heal (1988).
64 Id. at 25-6.
65 For criticisms of Bass & Davis, see Loftus & Ketcham, supra note 27 passim. On law-
suits, see Hallye Jordan, Repressed Memories Come Out as New Specialty, S.F. Daily Jour-
nal, Dec. 5, 1994, at 1, 8.
66 It should be noted, of course, that Holocaust survivor testimony and narrative can be
challenged as inaccurate as well. The Demjanjuk prosecution stands as an example of fail-
ing memory and mistaken identification of John Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible (although
Demjanjuk had been a guard at another camp). Lawrence Langer's Holocaust Testimonies
highlights both the difficulties of memory and the dismissal of particular memories even by
sympathetic observers and interviewers. Langer, supra note 1, at 9, 15-16, 28, 58-60.
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witnesses or liberators do not even exist. Even physical evidence of sexual
abuse is non-existent---or easily explained away-in many cases: not all
child victims are as "lucky" as Maya Angelou. 67 Thus, it has been rela-
tively easy to dismiss survivor stories as "unscientific, .... anecdotal,"
"advocacy scholarship," and downright "harmful. '68 The preexisting in-
terpretations of fantasy and false-because-there-is-no-corroboration re-
main intact; as we have no "objective, verifiable" proof that there is sexual
abuse, we can comfortably assume that the abuse does not exist.
Prosecutions for sexual abuse and tort suits quickly developed in re-
sponse to the emerging stories of sexual abuse, however. As the legal
system geared up to prosecute people charged with child sexual abuse,
debate over the extent of child abuse and believability of victims became
heated and quickly polarized. Virtually unsubstantiated claims that women
routinely falsely accused men of sexual abuse in custody disputes and that
sympathetic juries automatically believed children in all sexual abuse
cases became "common knowledge" in legal circles69; attention quickly
shifted to persecution of innocent men. Deep fractures developed in the
psychological and psychiatric communities over the reliability of chil-
dren's and adults' testimony and ability to remember as well.70 A number
of heated battles at the American Psychiatric Association 7' and American
Psychological Association meetings72 in the last few years, as well as an
67 Maya Angelou, I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (1969). In her autobiography, Ange-
lou powerfully tells the story of being brutally raped (is there any other kind of rape?) by
her stepfather/mother's boyfriend, suffering internal injuries and bleeding. She was believed
when she "told," and there was even a trial in which the perpetrator was convicted, although
given a very light sentence. When the man was killed, Angelou, feeling guilty, resolved to
"stop talking," for which she was punished. Id. at 74-85.
68 A past president of the American Psychiatric Association apparently considered thera-
pists who gave The Courage to Heal to clients to be committing malpractice. See Kenneth
S. Pope, supra note 49, at 967. Loftus takes a similar tack. Loftus & Ketcham, supra note
27, at 140-175.
69 See infra note 133 and accompanying text. I have heard attorneys make this claim in Colo-
rado, California, and Indiana. Some judges have stated this publicly as well.
70 Pope, supra note 49, chronicles some of the changes and counter-changes. See id. at
969-970. See also Loftus & Ketcham, supra note 27, at 207-13 (quoting Richard Ofshe as
saying "[t]his is an ideological battle with truth and justice, right and wrong up for grabs").
71 See Katy Butler, 'False Memory'-True Problem or Bad Therapy?, S.F. Chron., May
27, 1993, at A1, A19.
72 Loftus' and Ketcham's The Myth of Repressed Memory contains numerous attacks on
those who disagree with their contentions that recovered memories of abuse are false and
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outpouring of books on the subject,73 reflect this polarization. Again, al-
though much of the furor has focused on the debate over the existence of
recovered memory-a very narrow category of cases74-it has also arisen
over questions of whether there is such as thing as Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), 75 whether children are automati-
cally telling the truth or lying, whether children are coached by venal
adults,76 and whether children are able to recall events accurately. 77 In
addition, debate continues over whether sexual abuse is damaging to chil-
the result of therapeutic malpractice (or worse). Loftus & Ketcham, supra note 27, at 171-
75, 218-26. Unfortunately, the American Psychological Association's Working Group on
Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse, appointed in 1993, was comprised of psy-
chologists who had already declared virtually intractable stances, with researchers Loftus,
Ornstein, and Ceci on one side, claiming that science proves recovered memories are often
false, and clinicians Alpert, Brown, and Courtois on the other, claiming that memories are
often true. Although it can be portrayed as simply a "bitter skirmish[ ] between the scien-
tific and practice communities," the inconclusive Final Report, containing only a few points
of agreement, appears to be the result of a bit more than simple methodological disagree-
ments, as several participants are suing each other, have resigned from the APA, and so on.
See Robert Barasch, Ph.D., Next Big Quake? APA False Memory Group Sharply Split,
Nat'l Psychol., Vol. 5, No. 4, July/August 1996, at 1-2.
73 See, e.g., Louise Armstrong, Rocking the Cradle of Sexual Politics: What Happened
When Women Said Incest 187 (1994); Ofshe and Watters, supra note 62.
74 See Bonnie Miller Rubin, Presumed Guilty, Chi. Trib., May 30, 1993, at 1; Ross E.
Cheit, The False Memory Crisis: An Empirical and Social Critique, paper delivered at 1995
Annual Meeting, Law & Society Ass'n, Toronto, Canada. Cheit's report on data he is gath-
ering refuted the claim that massive injustices are occurring or that disgruntled adult chil-
dren are suing their parents gratuitously.
75 Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Tes-
timony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2027, 203940 (1994)
(quoting Dr. Roland Summit, the "originator" of CSAAS). The authors go on to argue that
the studies of child sexual abuse are flawed and difficult to verify, id. at 2086, and that
CSAAS and expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases "is not sufficiently reliable to be
admitted, even when ordered by the most qualified and experienced expert witness." Id. at
2101. See also Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes, Abuse, and Politics in Criminal Trials and
Evidence Law, 46 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 12, on file with author)
(arguing that CSAAS cannot be used diagnostically but could be used to rehabilitate an
impeached child witness, and cautioning against "abuse" of this evidence).
76 Leora N. Rosen & Michelle Etlin, The Hostage Child 101-06 (1996) (discussing claims
of "false allegations" in custody disputes). See also infra notes 154-58.
77 Daniel Goleman, Studies Reveal Suggestibility of Very Young as Witnesses, N.Y.
Times, June 11, 1993, at Al, A23; Kathleen McCarthy, Kids' Eyewitness Recall is Focus
For Conference, APA Monitor, July 1993, at 1, 28-29. See also infra notes 135-49 and ac-
companying text.
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dren, 78 as well as whether it has effects as significant as other forms of
abuse and neglect. 79
In 1990, the media were still reporting sympathetically on efforts to
combat child sexual abuse and incest,80 but by 1994, U.S. News and
World Report attributed some of the backlash against "recovered memo-
ries" of sexual abuse to a belief that concern about sexual abuse of chil-
dren is related to "a radical feminist agenda, another avenue for women to
voice rage against sexual violence."' l Thus, within a very short period of
time-less than a decade-the dominant narrative explanations for claims
of sexual abuse reemerged in the form of vehement denials from a variety
of quarters, in line with the backlash against feminism's work to end vio-
lence against women generally.
Undoubtedly exacerbated by a resort, through the criminal law, to an
adversarial legal system, resistance to claims of sexual abuse of children
strengthened in light of a series of legal disasters that played into the
dominant narratives of fantasy, falsehood, and non-existence. These legal
disasters included the highly publicized McMartin and Mchaels8 2 day-
care cases in California and New Jersey. The McMartin case alone cost
million dollars to prosecute,83 lasted a total of thirty-three months, and
resulted in acquittal of two remaining defendants on fifty-two counts of
molestation. 84 The jury failed to reach a verdict on thirteen counts against
78 Cf. Haugaard & Reppucci, supra note 42, at 74, 82, 98.
79 Id. at 84-6.
80 See, e.g., Beckett, supra note 23, at 69 (quoting People magazine).
81 Miriam Horn, Memories Lost and Found, U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 29, 1993, at
52, 55. Ironically, Horn's article concerns Prof. Ross Cheit's recovered, and corroborated,
memory. See Katy Butler, S.F. Boys Chorus Settles Abuse Case, S.F. Chron., Sept. 1, 1994,
at A2 (Cheit's 25-year-old recovered memory supported by "substantial evidence").
This rhetorical move discrediting efforts to communicate a harm as part of a "feminist
agenda" is depressingly familiar: the same arguments have been and continue to be made against
reforming (and enforcing) rape and other sexual abuse laws. See, e.g., Katie Roiphe, The
Morning After (1994) (criticizing feminist rape reform efforts); Neil Gilbert, The Phantom
Epidemic of Sexual Assault, 103 The Public Interest 54 (1991) (criticizing feminist efforts);
Nancy Gibbs, When Is It Rape?, Time, June 3, 1991, at 48, 53 (some feminists "too quick"
to classify "sex" as "rape").
82 State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489 (1993), affd, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994) [hereinafter
Michaels 1].
83 Dziech & Schudson, supra note 22, at 76.
84 Kincaid, supra note 22, at 343.
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one defendant. 85 (Charges against five codefendants were dismissed by
the District Attorney before trial.86) The trial, based on the testimony both
of children who were coached and cajoled and of their panicked parents,
also involved bizarre stories of ritual abuse; the case stands as a horror
story of irresponsible prosecution.87
In the Michaels case, a jury convicted Kelly Michaels, a day-care su-
pervisor, of 115 counts of assault and child endangerment.8 8 The New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the convictions, 89 and
the New Jersey Supreme Court affimed.90 The appellate court rested the
reversal both on the grounds that an expert's testimony on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome was improperly admitted91 and that the
trial judge failed to interview the children individually before deciding to
allow them to testify by closed circuit television. 92 The appellate court
also expressed concern that the trial judge had shown bias by expressing
concern for the children who testified from his chambers by closed circuit
television.93 The judge had held the children in his lap, played with them,
whispered to them, and apparently had generally manifested tenderness
and concern that could influence the jury (although also making testifying
more comfortable for the children).94 The New Jersey Supreme Court af-
firmed the appellate division on different grounds, focusing on the im-
permissible taint of statements and testimony because of the pretrial inter-
rogation of the children by law enforcement.95 Unless the prosecution
85 Id. A second trial on those counts also resulted in a hung jury. Id.
86 Id. at 342; Crewdson, supra note 22, at 153-54.
87 Crewdson, supra note 22, at 150-151.
88 Michaels 1, 625 A.2d at 493.
89 Id. at 489.
90 State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1385 (1994) [hereinafter Michaels 11].
91 Michaels 1, 625 A.2d at 524, 593-605. The exact rationale for the finding of prejudicial
error is unclear--that is, whether it was the expert's "ultimate fact" diagnosis of the chil-
dren's symptoms as being "consistent with" Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome, or doubts about the testimony's scientific validity, or simply that the testimony was
admitted in the case-in-chief rather than to rehabilitate the children's testimony.
92 Id. at 506-08.
93 Id. at 508.
94 Id.
95 Michaels 11, 642 A.2d at 1384-85.
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could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children's testi-
mony "nonetheless retain[ed] a sufficient degree of reliability to warrant
admissibility at trial," a burden that the court seemed to think was insur-
mountable, no child could qualify to testify in a new trial.96
The appendix to the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion contains
several transcripts of police interviews confirming that law enforcement
officers did exert an unacceptable degree of pressure on the children in-
volved. For example, one transcript of an "interview" with a young child,
who had stated repeatedly that he did not want to talk and "I hate you," 97
quotes the investigator as stating, "Tell me what happened.... I'll make
you fall on your butt again," and "Tell me what Kelly did to your hiney
and then you can go. If you tell me what she did to your hiney we'll let
you go." 98 A major problem in the Michaels case, therefore, lies in the
detectives' unconscionable bullying, pressuring, and cajoling of the chil-
dren, although courts regularly shrug at similar-or worse-tactics used
by law enforcement to interrogate suspects and witnesses in other kinds of
cases.99
The McMartin and Michaels cases preserved the "innocence" of chil-
dren, in that neither case really centered on claims that children were pur-
posely lying; rather, the problems were with the intimidation, coaching,
and manipulation of child witnesses by adult authority figures. Neverthe-
less, suspicions about the credibility of child witnesses in other sexual
abuse cases increased dramatically as a result of these and other legal dis-
asters. 100 Popular culture and the media moved from shocked accounts of
horrible abuse and-as is typical in media coverage of criminal cases-
rapid conclusions that those accused were guilty, to outraged accounts of
innocent people railroaded by false accusations, overzealous prosecutors,
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1388.
98 Id. at 1387-88.
99 Long and badgering interrogations of exhausted prisoners, for example, still pass consti-
tutional muster; other ploys and suggestive interviewing of defendants and witnesses are
fairly commonplace. See generally Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions:
Essays in Law and Policy (1980); Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation
as a Confidence Game, 30 Law & Soc'y Rev. 259 (1996); Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies,
and Interrogation, 3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 3 (1996); Richard Jerome, Suspect Confessions,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1995, (Magazine), at 28.
100 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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and over-reactive adults. 101 As a result, any progress made toward under-
standing child sexual abuse appears to have been stalled, if not reversed,
and attempts to prove its existence have become extremely difficult again.
Unfortunately, my reaction to all this is an unscholarly rage, but I also
have my moments of denial and confusion. I, too, wish it would all just go
away.'0 2 But witnessing the pain and anguish of adults who were abused,
having worked with girls in juvenile hall who often had documented his-
tories of sexual abuse, as well as my own background and involvement in
an actual case a few years ago, render it impossible for me to ignore these
issues.
III. THE (PARTIAL) STORY OF A LrTTLE GIRL
The denigration of, and backlash against, assertions of child sexual
abuse results in part from the fact that sexual abuse, especially of female
children, is a harm that exists in an epistemological vacuum and is sur-
rounded by denial, resistance, ignorance, and fear. To work at all, law
must at a minimum rest on some consensus about what constitutes a be-
lievable story and what does not. Because no stable or widely accepted
narratives or categories of knowledge about sexual abuse existed prior to
the resort to legal solutions, the destabilization of an already tentative un-
derstanding and narrative of abuse was perhaps inevitable. At the same
time, however, the cost has been staggering: gains in knowledge about the
crime have been stymied. As a result, cases remain difficult, if not impos-
sible, to bring in criminal or civil court successfully. This in turn raises
questions of how, indeed, one can prove anything to an unwilling or resist-
ing audience, an audience unreceptive to assertions, because of the ab-
sence of cognitive, emotional, or narrative frames for understanding.
I hope to illustrate the very real contemporary difficulties with con-
fronting child sexual abuse by recounting my own experience of how dif-
ficult it was for me to "prove" its existence in one case without the aid of
any agreed-upon narrative to support my interpretation of a group of facts
101 See Beckett, supra note 23, at 69-70.
202 Someone comes to me in a panic because a two-year-old female relative may have been
sexually abused by her father. Another has a "flashback," re-experiencing an assault, while
working on a sexual assault case. A student writes a reflection piece about her incest expe-
riences. I suggest counseling, sometimes offer names of therapists I believe are knowledge-
able and responsible, and sit in my office thinking, "Oh, God."
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as abuse, and against the existing contextual background of stories defin-
ing what is "real" and what is "imagined."
As Langer observed in Holocaust Testimonies, written texts or mem-
oirs invent a narrative voice that "seeks to impose on apparently chaotic
episodes a perceived sequence, whether or not that sequence was per-
ceived in an identical way during the period that is being rescued from
oblivion by memory and language."10 3 Thus, while the following story
does contain a narrative sequence, and describes how the narrative came
to be, it fails to capture what was, for me, a truly chaotic experience of
realizing that something was terribly wrong, trying to stop that wrong by
using the options I believed to be available, and experiencing additional
events that confirmed that a child was in danger. Re-telling is also a re-
construction, an embellishment perhaps, that itself could be challenged as
inaccurate, convenient, or the product of self-serving memory, at least in
some of the details, but I have tried to be faithfil to the facts. The original
version of narrative that follows was written close to the time during
which the events occurred, but I have added some memories and deleted
others that I believe distract from the telling. Further, although I kept de-
tailed notes of events as they occurred, and I have attempted to follow
those notes, I also have tried to delete any information that could poten-
tially lead to identification of the child. This in itself changes the narrative,
highlighting some things while omitting others that might be important
elements of "truth." Perhaps in an effort to sustain my hopes of credibility,
I may have filled gaps that I ought not have. As readers, you may identify
major gaps that remain in the story, and ask yourself how you might fill
them and why. At the end of the section, you might ask what counts as the
known and unknown, and what role law plays in defining the known and
unknown, in this particular case.
One summer, I acquired a new downstairs neighbor at an apartment
that I had rented for many years. This white, presumably middle-class
man was not alone; he had a little girl with him. (I didn't know her age;
she was young but not a toddler.) It took little time for me to become
aware of the seemingly constant-but actually, only frequent, daily,--
yelling by the man and crying by the child. The child was seldom outside;
I never saw her playing with other the children in the complex. When she
was outside, she was always close to, if not actually holding hands with,
103 Langer, supra note 1, at 41.
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the man who had introduced himself as a single parent raising the child
alone.
The noise--the yelling, the refrain of "Shut up! Shut up! I'm trying to
work," and the child's responses of "Daddy please," went on morning,
afternoon, and evening. I'd turn up my television or radio and still hear his
yelling and her pleas and cries. One morning when things seemed particu-
larly acute to me, I knocked on the door and asked the man if everything
was "O.K." He said yes, everything was fine, he was only trying to get
some work done. But the noise continued daily and into the evenings--
yelling, crying, pleading, fighting, bumps, thumps, running feet. I grew
more concerned. Finally, I tried to talk to the apartment manager about
my concerns, but I was cut off abruptly by the manager, who said, "I
know what you're thinking.... She's a brat." I replied with some annoy-
ance that the manager did not know what I was thinking, but I did not
elaborate.
Apparently, someone spoke to the neighbor, identifying me as the
complainant. In a subsequent interaction, the man saw me as I was going
upstairs and declared that he wasn't yelling at her anymore, that things
had been quiet. I demurred, knowing full well that I had continued to hear
his yells and her screams. I definitely had been cast as the intrusive,
snoopy neighbor! Was I a crank? Was I overreacting? Or was the child
being abused in some way? I didn't "know;" all I knew at this point was
that it didn't feel right to me. I also "knew" a number of stories: parents
have rights, alternatives to custody are often terrible, juvenile court is a
disaster. I also had parts of my own story, a story for which I have no co-
herent narrative, and which reverberated every time I heard her cry or him
yell. It all seemed so familiar to me, and thus, so wrong. (In memory, it
could have been my sister's or my own cries and pleas.) I tried earplugs in
the evenings and mornings when I was there, but perhaps my
"hypersensitivity" allowed me to hear anyway.
A few weeks later, I was awakened around 11:30 at night by a sound
that I had never heard a human child make-I initially thought it was a cat
fight or a hurt animal. Shortly thereafter, I heard the man yelling "Shut
up! Shut up!" The next morning, I called Child Protective Services (CPS),
convinced that something was terribly wrong. At some level, I just
"knew" it was sexual abuse, but of course I had no "proof." This was to be
the first of a year-long series of telephone calls to the police and CPS.
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I alternately thought that I was crazy, overreacting, ridiculous, and
completely accurate in my assessment that the child was being sexually
abused and perhaps abused in other ways. (I certainly thought the daily
routine of yelling at the child was emotionally abusive, but probably not
actionable.) I talked with people, agonized over whether I was imagining
things, doubted my ability to assess the situatior---a single parent raising a
child alone might be "stressed out" and yell, but that isn't a crime. Friends
with children assured me that kids yell and cry all the time. I have no chil-
dren of my own, so even though I had taken care of young children for
long periods of time in the past, the fact that I was not a parent myself
meant that I could be easily discounted. Further, my own history of
growing up in a violent and abusive household did not make me any more
credible; to the contrary, it seemed to make me less so. I might be overly
suspicious and unrealistic, exaggerating because of personal bias, or hy-
persensitive and over-reactive.
My awareness of the epistemological and legal problems with proving
anything I thought did make me doubt my intuitions and even my hearing.
I hadn't seen any indication of injuries to the child-no bruises, unex-
plained injuries, broken bones-and I had obviously not witnessed what
was physically happening when I heard those sounds. Also, I knew that I
might actually be endangering the child by meddling; he might escalate
the abuse in retaliation if the manager or the authorities got involved.
During a holiday break, I heard crying, screaming, thumps, bumps, "Shut
up!"--and remained silent. (I also spent as little time at home as possible
to avoid hearing.)
The noise was constant and distressing one weekend a few months
later. I called the police, because the bangs, thumps, crashes, and screams
made me unable to ignore the situation any longer. This call resulted in a
police officer calling to inform me that he had been to the home, the child
was fine, the man had said he was trying to get some work done, the
house was clean, and that there was no problem. The officer said a CPS
worker would also call me the following week. I did receive a call from a
CPS worker who assured me that the house was clean. (Why was that im-
portant? I wasn't calling about a "dirty house!") She also told me that no
one had made any effort to talk to the child at her school or away from her
parent. (What was the girl going to say to an authority figure in her fa-
ther's presence? "This is my daddy who I love and he abuses me?")
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The CPS worker asserted that all was well and went on to inform me
that the parent was aware of support services but was uninterested in assis-
tance. (So much for the "stressed out parent" story.) Yet, even while I was
on the phone with the CPS worker, the man was yelling at the child, and I
simultaneously reported to the worker precisely what I heard him saying:
"Shut your mouth! Shut up! I'm sick and tired of people knocking at the
door! I'm tired of people not minding their own business! Shut up! ...
And I hope you can hear me, lady." (The latter apparently was addressed
to me. Was it evidence that I was putting the child in danger?)
A few months later, in the early evening, I heard a crash, followed by
a scream. I had despaired both of trusting my instinct that something was
wrong and of my ability to do anything about it. After all, I had inquired, I
had spoken with a number of people and "the authorities" a number of
times. A while later, there was loud knocking at the door; the neighbor
stood outside with the little girl, dressed in pajamas and a robe, by the
hand. He announced, "She wants to apologize to the lady upstairs for
making noise." It broke my heart and prompted me to try to do something
yet again. I called CPS the following day, spoke with the worker with
whom I had spoken before, and related the incident. Rather than using
what I had come to believe were my past incoherent bleats, I tried to put
together a story that invoked my authority as a law professor and lawyer
familiar with abuse and neglect cases, the sequence of events, and a de-
mand for action. The CPS worker disclosed some information to me that
she should never have told me according to the law governing confiden-
tiality in child welfare cases. That information, however, convinced me
that CPS should have acted immediately, despite my incoherence or the
vagueness of my calls. It appeared by the end of our conversation, how-
ever, that the social worker did not plan to do anything beyond what she
had already "done" about the situation. (I guess this is in sharp contrast to
the model of the overly intrusive social workers favored by critics of CPS;
she was clearly "rooting for" the parent.)
Again, I agonized over what I should do; I had nightmares, consulted
with experts, and drove my friends crazy. Yet I doubted my perceptions.
Rather than saying that, as a survivor, I had access to experiential knowl-
edge that made me a kind of expert, I discredited myself, believing that
maybe this whole thing was a fantasy. "Just because" I was abused didn't
mean that she was being abused, was I one of those overzealous types
spotting abuse whenever and wherever? I also had to ask what my mo-
tives were. That became very clear: protect the little girl, make it stop.
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Selfishly, I just couldn't stand hearing her screams anymore, but less self-
ishly, I did want to make sure she wasn't in danger.
I knew that, according to DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services,10 4 the state has no duty to protect children from
"private" violence. I knew about overworked CPS workers, I knew about
"proof'-' "No bruises? Well, then ... ." "Is she starving? Is she being left
alone?" (No, quite the opposite.) "Is she missing school?" No, no, no. I
knew that I had already done "more than most," and some advised me that
there was nothing else that I could do, other than move if it bothered me
so much. One friend responded to my anguished (and obsessive?) di-
lemma by trying to find ways to appeal to "higher authorities," supporting
my quest for one last way to stop it.
I anguished some more. I decided I had to try one more time before I
gave up completely. I decided to invoke the written word and as authori-
tative a voice as I could muster in my last attempt to "do something." I
spent one late afternoon writing a four-page letter to the CPS worker,
documenting in chronological order much of what I had heard, seen, and
reported. I put many things I had observed and heard into a narrative
framed by and invoking my knowledge of and expertise with the law of
abuse and neglect. (I didn't bother with the part about my own history.) I
strove to make the letter "real," "balanced," "objective," and "detached;" I
tried to write a coherent and balanced narrative account of a sequence of
events: who, what, when, how, and where, with due acknowledgment that
I had no "direct" proof (sounds and words and observations being subject
to varying interpretations), but emphasizing that I did have a basis for my
concern. I made indirect reference to the breach of confidentiality by the
CPS worker as a bit of a threat (which was probably useless as a catalyst
for action after DeShaney'05) and emphasized my "expertise" as a lawyer
who had worked on abuse and neglect cases. I included information from
another neighbor who had been afraid to report. By that time, I had defi-
nitely crossed into the snoopy neighbor category, conducting my own lit-
tle "investigation."
104 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
105 1 am grateful to Marnie Mahoney for the observation that one of the effects of
DeShaney is to lessen incentives for state actors to respond to or investigate properly com-
plaints and concerns about child abuse. Combined with criticisms of state intervention in
family matters, lack of funding, and overburdened agencies, a lack of any legal means of
making agencies responsible for omissions only undermines efforts to help children in dan-
ger.
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After I had mailed the letter, I saw the girl once when I was petting
another neighbor's cat on a porch between apartments. She stood, watch-
ing me, and I heard the man yell at her to get inside. After the second time
he yelled, she turned and ran into the apartment. I also heard him yell at
her once, dismissing her efforts to point out a flower----"Flower, daddy!
Look, flower!"---with a "shut up, get moving." (That one still makes me
cry.) There was an awkward interaction another time, when he appeared,
gripping her hand, and stood and stared at me while I was chatting with
someone outside. (Was he trying to intimidate me? Or was I just being
paranoid and hypersensitive?) Another time, I saw him on the front porch,
cutting her very long hair and sharply saying, "Stand still" over and over.
Then I noticed that she didn't seem to be around. (When one is used
to constant yelling and crying, one also notices its absence.) Another
neighbor, concerned about the little girl, asked if I had seen her. I replied
that I would call CPS if she didn't appear by the following Monday-
after all, she could be at camp, or visiting someone, or something-
replacement narratives for my fear that something terrible might have
happened. That weekend, I got a call from a different CPS worker asking
if she could use my letter for "legal proceedings." Properly trained in
confidentiality, she revealed absolutely nothing; I finally asked her, "I ha-
ven't seen [the child] around, can you tell me this-is she safe?" There
was a long pause, then a soft reply: "Yes, she's safe."
Later, I was able to confirm that someone had interviewed the child at
her school, and, on the basis of whatever she said, she was taken into state
custody immediately. Heaven knows what trauma that must have caused.
The new CPS social worker and I talked about whether and when the let-
ter could be used for a dependency proceeding in juvenile court. Again,
silencing doubts crept into my thoughts: was out-and-out removal of the
child good? Where was she? Isn't it harmful to remove children from their
homes? Knowing the paucity of good alternatives and the horrid places
she might have been taken, the studies indicating the often devastating
effects of foster care, and the stories of people who would have been-or
were-devastated by "removal from the home," I worried a great deal. On
the other hand, I was developing a very strong opinion against the neigh-
bor. As I learned a little more about the abuse, I personally wanted his pa-
rental rights terminated. (That was my most noble sentiment.)
Almost a month later, I learned from a neighbor that the police ar-
rested the man. The next information I received was not from the prosecu-
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tor's office or the detective for the case; rather, I learned that the Public
Defender's Office was trying to contact me to determine whether to de-
clare a conflict of interest in the case. The reason? I personally knew some
lawyers in the office, I guess. And over time, I learned that there was
widespread agreement that "the theory" of the defense (the story that the
defense planned to use) would be to attack me and my credibility. As ex-
plained to me later, the PD indicated in his motion to "conflict out" that
the defense would attack me as an identified rape survivor. Why on earth
did a rape that had happened over ten years ago have anything to do with
my credibility as a witness in a present criminal prosecution? How about
attacking me for being one of those man-hating feminist law professors?
(The lying vengeful woman story.) Worst of all, what if they discovered
that I had been abused as a child? (Something that would have been rela-
tively easy for a conscientious defense investigator to unearth.) Does that
completely discredit me as a rape survivor/lawyer/witness to other child
abuse? Or does it mean that I might have an enhanced sensitivity, alert-
ness, or awareness?
The detective investigating the case contacted me about reading my
letter to CPS in court before he testified in the preliminary hearing. After
the preliminary hearing, the court held the man to answer on charges of
felony child abuse and felony child molestation. The detective and others
told me that I wouldn't need to testify if there was a trial. Experts were
assuring me that there was nothing I could testify to--I hadn't seen any-
thing, or heard a specific set of words that added up to a believable narra-
tive. The gaps in my narrative were huge, and the unknown became the
unknowable became the unprovable. Yet I knew all along that I would be
subpoenaed. I had been the reporting party; I had written the letter, and I
might lend some "corroboration" for whatever evidence the district attor-
ney had.
I was, indeed, subpoenaed for trial. The thought of the child having to
testify against her parent distressed me, as did the thought that she had
endured who knew how many repeated interviews with various strangers
after she was removed from her home. (I later learned that repeated inter-
views did not occur, fortunately.) The thought of some defense attorney
cross-examining this little girl who loved her daddy appalled me. (The
thought of my having to testify and be cross-examined didn't thrill me,
either, to be honest.) In my mind, it came down to a narcissistic (law pro-
fessor's) belief that the case depended on me and an undoubtedly fright-
ened little girl. I had to be as accurate and perfect in my recollections as
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possible. I carefully made notes of what I could say I had objectively
"heard," said, when, where, how. I tried to impose order and meaning on
chaos without invention to fill in the huge gaps in "my" story. I thought of
what I would do if I was cross-examined about my feminist beliefs, my
rape articles, my life.
I wanted to make it all go away as well. Stories of bad foster care,
trauma to children separated from their parents, disastrous criminal cases,
and of my own selfish inability to stand her cries battled with my belief
that not to have acted would result in immeasurable harm and, to me,
would have been morally indefensible. In November of that year, the
neighbor entered an Alford 0 6 plea-a plea that does not require the de-
fendant to admit guilt but that is the functional equivalent--to one count
of felony child abuse and one count of felony child sexual abuse. I arrived
in my office early one morning to find a message from the District Attor-
ney's office on my answering machine: "We couldn't have done it with-
out you."
The man was sentenced to serve a year in jail and placed on eight
years felony probation. The conditions of probation included counseling,
no contact with children without a "responsible adult present," and regis-
tration as a sex offender. In my own moral outrage, I wanted the man
locked up for life, but to put the child through a trial would have been aw-
ful. And the result was not "bad:" as the DA later said, she could protect
the little girl until she was fourteen.
But ultimately, what did I do? I tried to stop abuse by telling a story,
by trying to create a coherent and acceptable narrative of abuse on very
fragmentary "objective" information and a source of knowledge that no
one would recognize as objective or valid. That story ultimately landed
me and a little girl in the quagmire of the criminal process, and in a realm
of power and knowledge that seeks to silence such stories once and for all.
That in this case I was "right"--I have more information now than I did
when I contacted CPS' 07-does not now mean that the story I told CPS
was any more coherent or believable at the time.
106 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
107 1 have found those officially involved extraordinarily reluctant to talk about the case;
some of this has to do with confidentiality concerns, no doubt, even if, by proceeding with a
criminal prosecution, much information became public record. The Deputy District Attor-
ney a year later told me I "didn't want to know" what the man had done to the child, or
what she had said, for example. The DA was much more forthcoming about her anger that
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IV. NARRATIVE, PROOF, AND CREDIBILITY
Generally, in common discourse, to call something criminal is to call
it immoral as well. Criminal law is first and foremost about defining and
applying moral values that determine, shape, and define facts, whether we
are always conscious of this or not. Indeed, feminism's project over the
last two decades has included a sustained effort to persuade legislators,
courts, and the public that harms to women-including rape and batter-
ing-are serious moral wrongs that criminal law ought to address. As part
of this effort, feminists have worked to displace the conventional morali-
ties of gender relations through law reform.
As I have argued elsewhere, the resistance to rape reform stems at
least in part from conventionalist beliefs and narratives about the morality
of heterosexuality which render women morally responsible for sexual
intercourse. 08 The mixed success of these efforts in turn illustrates how
the "objective" and the "moral" worlds of criminal law interact. Prosecu-
tors', judges', and jurors' tenacious insistence on corroboration or prompt
complaints in rape cases-because a woman's word is not sufficient to
prove a rape-is one example of the demand for "objective," "verifiable"
"facts."' 1 9 (Note, however, the devaluation of a woman's word or voice as
a "fact.") The continuing belief that rape shield statutes block access to
relevant information is another. 10
her office had forced her to "settle" the case, in part because of the expense of trial, while
she realized it would have been difficult for the little girl. She was aware that the man was
"making progress" in therapy, but she had lost contact with the child, who had been doing
well, because of the "confidentiality" surrounding placement, etc. The investigating officer
was reluctant to speak about the matter or to be identified, but he did provide reassurance
that the child had only been interviewed once, in keeping with what is now considered to be
sound practice. He indicated that "other" evidence-the child's drawings, her statements,
the man's statements, and a physical exam-could be interpreted in a number of ways. He
also stated that a number of officers had their suspicions about the man, but since there is
no "profile" of a perpetrator, and hunches are not enough, they could do nothing. Yet an-
other officer who was involved in the arrest of the man expressed her delight in having been
able to participate in the arrest.
108 Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & Phil. 127, 130-31 (1992); Lynne
Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 Tex. J. Women & L.
41,42 (1993).
109 See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair
Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1013, 1041 (1991).
110 Rape shield laws have been criticized for denying defendants their Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation. See, e.g., Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite
Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1219, 1220 (1985).
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The feminist critique and use of criminal law to prevent (or punish)
sexual violence has been only mildly successful, in part because the epis-
temological and narrative assumptions upon which the criminal law is
grounded rely upon "objectivism" and "moral conventionalism" as the
keys to understanding an event as a crime or not a crime. By
"objectivism," I mean a rigid adherence to a belief that there are known,
observable "facts" that can be weighed, measured, observed, and quanti-
fied, regardless of the identity of the weigher, measurer, observer, or
quantifier."I' By "moral conventionalism," I mean what is ordinarily as-
sumed to be right and wrong, good or bad, in a culture, or at least the
dominant culture. Both objectivism and conventionalism have disadvan-
taged women in the criminal process, but let me be clear: I am not saying
that empiricism is wrong, or that attempts at objectivity are wrong, only
that they are always partial and incomplete. Nor am I saying that moral
conventionalism is necessarily wrong-although I believe it to be more
suspect than objectivism or empiricism, given its use to justify oppression
and discrimination against women and other groups. In any event, objec-
tivism and moral conventionalism in turn define what is seen as knowable
and not knowable, what is believable and what is not.
Furthermore, objectivism and moral conventionalism are interrelated,
and this interrelationship has deeply affected research in the field of
sexualized gender violence. This may be in part because of the reluctance
of criminal law, objectivism, and conventionalism to absorb feminist
knowledge and insights. 12 The struggle is over epistemologies, morali-
ties, and challenges to settled conventions, and, as Catharine MacKinnon
has written, "who does what to whom and gets away with It."113 As I ar-
gue below, concern about child sexual abuse has reproduced the same
pathologies and patterns of resistance to changes in understanding that
have existed in response to the feminist challenges to comfortable as-
sumptions about rape, battering, and sexual harassment, but, here, disrupt-
ing the patterns is even more difficult.
IIl Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives
138-39 (1991).
112 For a sympathetic account of feminist efforts that nevertheless accepts the conventions
and "theories" of criminal law, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in
Criminal Law, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151 (1995).
113 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State 138 (1989).
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As already noted, the subject of child sexual exploitation and abuse is
uncomfortable to contemplate or think about, even for the most open-
minded and thoughtful of us; the possibility is too painful to admit into
awareness. When discomfort arises, we tend to choose the more comfort-
able narrative, the story that appears to enjoy epistemological favor, the
narrative that reinforces our understanding of probabilities. 1 4 In the in-
stance of child sexual abuse, alternative explanations, counter-narratives,
and general resistance even to believing claims all enable us to avoid the
discomfort. As in the case in which I was involved, alternative explana-
tions and stories such as "stressed out parent" and "kids cry all the time"
can provide a comforting, if negating, counterpoint to a troubling reality.
The (re)discovery of child sexual abuse in the early 1980s led to an
alarmed, but relatively uninformed rush to "do something" legally--
particularly through criminal prosecution. Unfortunately, because child
sexual abuse had been denied and ignored for years, little empirical re-
search or accepted knowledge of the crime existed; objectivism had in
turn facilitated ignorance. While moral conventionalism certainly con-
denned sexual contact with children, conventional belief was-and ap-
pears to remain-that sexual abuse is a rare crime committed by identifi-
able monsters. As in any criminal case, the adversariness and high stakes
for those charged with sexual abuse demanded objective certainty and
moral simplicity. The demand for certainty, within a context of disbelief
and sympathy for the wrongly accused, began to drive commentary, sci-
entific research, and legal rhetoric.
A recent book, Child Loving,"15 by a professor of English literature,
highlights the quandaries of the subject matter, the resistance to doing
anything, and the detrimental impact of the McMartin trial. The author,
who attended the trial, combines narratives of abuse of state power and
denial of harm in his examination of the sexualization of children in Vic-
toian literature. Ostensibly a deconstructive critique of our sexuaization
of children and of existing "power" structures, the book simultaneously
projects adult sexuality onto children and asserts that children use sex both
to feel loved and to entrap unsuspecting and vulnerable adults.' 1 6 Follow-
114 I am grateful to Janet Halley for this insight.
115 Kincaid, supra note 22.
116 Id. at 71-210, 385-86. Throughout, the book emphasizes the gentleness of the pedophile
and the harshness and violence of others against children, and describes children taking
advantage of the pedophile.
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ing Foucault, the author strongly suggests that invoking the state's legal
system and disciplining mechanisms perpetuates harm to innocents by
reinforcing narratives absolving most of us from our own complicity in
the sexualization of children, by portraying the pedophile as Other. 117 The
book does challenge comfortable narrative assumptions and stereotypes of
child molesters, 1 8 and reveals uncomfortable narratives of societal sexu-
alization of children.'19 But the author's analysis of children and sexuality
paints children as adult-like in sexual response, interest, and feelings of
pleasure in a way reminiscent of Freud, an image in ostensible contrast to
both Victorian and current social insistence on children's sexual and moral
innocence.
After the ritual incantations against child abuse that characterize all
current writing on the subject, the author examines literature and selected
research to infer that sexual encounters with adults are actually pleasurable
for children, and that children, either because they seek out these contacts
or because pedophiles are "loving," are not really "victims.' 120 Because
one study of twenty-five boys reported that "'the sexual contacts with the
adults appeared to have been a predominantly positive experience for vir-
tually all of the boys," 2'' the author concludes that there was no harm.
Because yet another researcher suggested that there was "little evidence"
of lasting harm to children, and that pedophiles are "typically unaggres-
sive, 'gentle and rational,""122 the author concludes that we ought not
"empower" children to allege abuse or take legal action. 123 McMartin is
the paradigm case the author cites to support his claim that legal action is
wrong. 12 4 Deflecting attention from sexual abuse, the author says that the
117 Id. at 378-91.
118 Id. at 202-10, 388-89.
119 Id. at 306-11.
120 Id. at 205-10.
121 Id. at 386-87.
122 Id. at 387.
123 Id. at 385-86.
124 Id. at 341-56. The author writes that there is no need for a "story" of child molestation
and pedophiles "apart from our need for it." Id. at 355. He claims that social scientists and
workers in the field, and even the police, tell a story among themselves that is entirely dif-
ferent. "This shadow/silent [sic] story readjusts every part of the public legend: there is no
evidence that any child-abduction ... rings exist; no commercial child-erotica is now pub-
lished, except by the F.B.I. for Sting operations; pedophiles, such as may exist, are gentle
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more important question is cruelty to children 12 5-as if sexually using
children were not cruel--leading us back to the comfortable state of be-
lieving that sexual abuse is not a problem of any significance.
At another level, the themes described by Mary Coombs in her article
on the legal and cultural strategy of imposing meta-narratives of "Not
True" and "So What?" on women's stories of rape and sexual harassment
in order to dismiss them as not objectively "real" have appeared with a
vengeance in coverage and treatment of child sexual abuse. 126 Briefly,
Coombs writes that "the range of 'credible' stories [of sexual violation] is
narrower than the range of true ones." 127 In the "Not True" interpretation,
the fact finder concludes that the woman is lying and the allegation is
false. Juries, judges, or others "conclude that the events did not happen as
she claims. The story she tells is radically different from what they already
'know'... "128 What others already know are received cultural under-
standings about who is a "real" perpetrator and who a "real" victim in the
context of accepted narratives that determine what constitutes "real rape"
or "real harassment."'1 29 In the instance of the "So What?" response, the
juries or judges decide that the facts do not constitute a violation, because
the facts do not fit the preexisting story of violation; alternatively, they
may conclude that the facts, though true, are not a violation, because the
victim is either unworthy or unharmed. 130 These interpretations that
and unaggressive, usually but not always male; almost all child-molesting comes not from
outside but from within the family circle." Id.
125 Id. at 362.
126 Mary Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. 277, 280-281 (1993).
127 Id. at 280.
128 Id. at 281.
129 The construction of such received understandings is itself something worthy of study;
the construction involves an interaction of legal and popular culture in determining which
narratives "count" and which don't. For example, the made-for-TV movie about helpless
victims or enraged victims and nasty perpetrators has constituted a whole genre and corn-
modification of victim narrative. These television films apparently even have an industry
"name"--"Jep" films, short for "jeopardy" (women in jeopardy). Jeffrey S. Neal, A
Woman's Place: Hollywood's Depiction of Violence Against Women and the Backlash
Female Attorney Film Movement of the late 1980s (unpublished student paper, on file with
author) (citing Richard Zoglin, Oh the Agony! The Ratings! Violence Against Women on
Television, Time, Nov. 11, 1991, at 88; Mark Harris, Dangerous Women, Entertainment
Weekly, April 24, 1992, at 36, for terms).
130 Coombs, supra note 126, at 282. A variation on this theme is that the adult is simply not
responsible for the molesting. In 1996, for example, a seven-year-old girl in foster care
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counter narratives of sexualized abuse do not necessarily exist separately;
they may combine and reinforce each other in a particular case. The meta-
narratives in turn, reinforce existing beliefs, practices, and myths that
permit a large number of sexual violations of adult women to go unrec-
ognized and unpunished by the legal system.
These same meta-narratives have emerged in the case of child sexual
abuse. Assertions that children lie, fantasize, are too suggestible to be be-
lieved, or are coached by vindictive or overzealous adults contribute to
perpetuating a meta-narrative of falsity. Adults who say they were abused
as children are also to be disbelieved, because they are lying about sud-
denly recovered memories out of vengefulness or because of therapeutic
malpractice. 13 1 The no harm interpretation is less present, but it exists in
beliefs that sexual contact with adults does not harm children--it's the
reactions of others that harm them---that a child abused by one person is
not damaged by further abuse, or that children are seductive and seek out
sexual play.
Yet, the feminist uncovering of child sexual abuse has suggested that
the assertion that children, especially female children, have lied or fanta-
sized about sexual abuse was itself false, as was the comfortable assump-
tion that there was no harm in sexual contact for children. 132 The horror,
perhaps, of that realization led to counterclaims that children never "lied"
about abuse133 and that they were irreparably damaged by such abuse.
These claims in turn were vulnerable to empirical and cultural challenge,
and by their very challenge to conventional understandings, kept these
possible interpretations of fantasies and lies in the foreground.
because of sexual abuse in her family was "allegedly" molested by the foster father. The
district attorney dismissed a felony charge against the man because the girl "'was very
sexually provocative' and "the accused did have the sense to stop the act and immediately
told his wife;" the district attorney stated that he was "not going to ignore the mitigating
circumstances in the case." Ruth Anne Long, Foster Parent Faces Molesting Charges, War-
saw, Indiana Times-Union, April 12, 1996, at IA, 2A.
131 Loftus & Ketcham, supra note 27, at 176-205; Bowman & Mertz, supra note 27, at 620-
22.
132 Herman, Father-Daughter Incest, supra note 57, at 28-32.
133 Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Re-
view and Synthesis, 113 Psych. Bull. No. 3, 403, 433 (1993) [hereinafter Suggestibility of
the Child Witness] (attributing claims both that "children never lie" and that "children are
incapable of getting it right" to "the media").
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As child sexual abuse claims grew more frequent in prosecutions and
custody disputes, pressures mounted once again to prove that children lied
or made up things to please adults, or that women lied and coached their
children to lie in custody disputes.' 34 Numerous attorneys with whom I
have spoken have confidently asserted that children make things up in
these cases and that women make false allegations in a high percentage of
custody disputes despite a lack of reliable empirical knowledge) 35 (I've
heard "as many as 80 percent.") Ironically, while reports of stories of vic-
timization are dismissed as "mere anecdotes," stories of wrongful accusa-
tions are taken at face value. The "Witch Hunt" trope began to pervade the
characterization of child sexual abuse cases, and, as we all "know," that
was a hideous moral error founded on lying children.
Perhaps as a result of the threat posed by the topic,' 36 developments in
both law and research appear to be moving towards a return to the earlier
state of affairs, in which child sexual abuse was invisible. Given the auto-
matic, and necessary, adversariness of the criminal system, this current
trend may have been inevitable. Because of their reliance on criminal law,
and in the absence of a settled narrative understanding, researchers and
legal actors began to make assertions about children and sexual abuse
without any foundation of cultural and empirical understanding or even
any "agreement" about the extent of the crime. 137 Others, in turn, took
opposing positions to the assertions and mustered data for their posi-
134 Richard Gardner, M.D., has claimed that those making supposedly false accusations
suffer from "Parent Alienation Syndrome," a product of "their mothers' paranoid fantasies."
Rosen & Etlin, supra note 76, at 102-03.
135 One California Superior Court Judge writes in his California Divorce Handbook that
molestation charges made "during a custody battle or dissolution are often untrue. They are
the neurotic response of a litigant filled with rage and hate for the other parent. Although 1
have no statistics, my sense is that less than 40 percent of the allegations against a natural
parent in the context of a dissolution appear to be true. The percentages resulting in crimi-
nal charges are less, and provable charges still less." Judge James W. Stewart, California
Divorce Handbook 94 (1990) (emphasis added). Judge Stewart is highly regarded by his
colleagues and is highly intelligent; yet he, too, promulgates the dominant story with no
evidence other than his hunches. See also the Hon. Patricia S. Curley, Some Suggestions for
Dealing with Sexual Assault Allegations in Family Court, 13 Wis. J. Faro. L. 96 (1993)
(arguing that accusations of sexual abuse serve "personal agendas" and hinder fact-finding
in family court).
136 Conte, supra note 19, at 227 (quoting Olafson et al., Modem History of Child Sexual
Abuse Awareness: Cycles of Discovery and Suppression, 17 Child Abuse & Neglect 7
(1993)).
137 Conte, supra note 19, at 224; Haugaard & Reppucci, supra note 42, at 31-59.
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tions.13s As Robin West has noted in her criticisms of Foucault's story of
sexuality and the village idiot, there is still no discussion of the silent,
watchful child. 139 She remains hidden, unheard, and without voice.
A. Child Testimony and Proof
In most criminal cases, the testimony of the victim is foundational to
establishing the elements of the offense. The demand of law and society
for proof of a crime calls for a kind of journalistic narrative from victims
and witnesses-who, what, when, where, and how--leading to the com-
mon lawyer's technique of mixing up events and sequences during cross-
examination to disrupt a witness' recall and credibility, or objecting dur-
ing direct examination to interrupt the witness' narrative flow. We tend to
expect detailed knowledge and recall from a witness, despite the fact that
no one's memory is perfect, in order to find her credible. Inaccuracy about
some parts of an event or inattention to detail is frequently used to im-
peach or discredit a witness' testimony. Yet witness' inconsistencies are
seldom scrutinized by legal actors, appellate courts, or laypersons with the
kind of microscope that has been applied to the testimony of rape and
sexual assault victims and child sexual abuse victims. 140
In child sexual abuse cases, reliance on the testimony of children is
fraught with difficulties even without the impassioned debates over the
existence of sexual abuse. Because sexual abuse of children, like rape and
sexual harassment of adults, often has no witness except the victim and no
physical injury, "proof' is especially difficult because of problems in tes-
138 Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 403,408-414.
139 West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, supra note 3, at 75-78.
140 Compare, for example, the psychological evidence attacking eyewitness identification
testimony with the relatively tolerant view of the admissibility and weight of eyewitness
identification on the part of trial and appellate courts. See U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967). Despite decades of research and writing attacking the reliability and admissibility of
such evidence, see, e.g., Howard E. Egeth & Michael McCloskey, Expert Testimony about
Eyewitness Behavior: Is it Safe and Effective?, in Eyewitness Testimony 283, 284 (Gary L.
Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psy-
chological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev.
969 (1977), eyewitness identification is routinely admitted and believed, even when there
are extremely suggestive circumstances involved. Moreover, despite the efforts of Loftus
and others to challenge the accuracy of identifications, in many instances identifications are
accurate. This does not mean that there are not many false positives, only that memory can
be reliable in many instances.
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timonial evidence. Although courts and laws historically excluded
younger children from testifying, 14 1 for the past several decades laws and
courts have admitted children's testimony. While questions about chil-
dren's competence, reliability, and trutfulness as witnesses in both civil
and criminal cases exist, 142 generally speaking, beyond rather simplified
procedures for determining their basic competence to testify, children
presently testify as witnesses in custody, juvenile, criminal, and tort cases
without much controversy. 143 Moreover, courts and legislatures have de-
termined with increasing frequency that even pre-adolescent children are
competent to be tried for crimes, sometimes even as adults, implying a
disposition to see children as cognitively capable of testifying and of being
able to engage in the cognitively complex activity of "assisting in their
own defense."' 144
Although Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Craig45 articulated
the view that children ought to be treated as all other witnesses for the
purposes of face-to-face confrontation, cross examination, and credibility
under the Confrontation Clause,146 to assume that testifying children
ought to be treated exactly the same as testifying adults overlooks devel-
opmental differences between children and adults. Children of all ages are
at more of a disadvantage compared to most adults in testifying in formal,
adversarial settings, although the disadvantages differ and change accord-
141 Dziech & Schudson, supra note 22, at 134.
142 Id. at 135-36.
143 Id. at 133-36. When I was practicing in juvenile court in the early 1980s, judges never ques-
tioned the competency of child witnesses beyond asling if they knew the difference between tell-
ing the truth and telling a lie.
144 Peter Fimrite, Prosecutor of Boy Softens His Stand, S.F. Chron., June 22, 1996, at A17,
A17-18 (quoting District Attorney as saying "He may not be competent now ... but in a
year from now he may be."). A 12 year-old girl in Texas was recently tried as an adult for
murder; she was convicted by a jury of "criminally negligent homicide" and "intentional
injury to a child." Up to 20-Year Sentence for Girl Who Killed Tot, S.F. Chron., Aug. 10,
1996, at A6.
145 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia raises the specter of a parent
sentenced to prison because he or she could not ask the child "personally or through coun-
sel, 'it is really not true, is it, that I-your father (or mother) whom you see before you-
did these terrible things?"' Id. at 861. He points to the Jordan Pre-School case as an exam-
ple of injustice caused by denial of confrontation. Id. at 868-69. The textual right to con-
frontation, for Scalia, could not be balanced against anything, but was absolute. Id. at 870.
146 Id. at 862, 868-69 (discussing the Sixth Amendment's value in requiring confrontation
to determine truth generally, and in the Jordan, Minnesota case in particular).
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ing to age and experience. Younger children are at a distinct disadvantage
in a process that demands the ability to give a journalistic form of narra-
tive, as they simply may not have the cognitive and linguistic skills to use
this form of communication effectively. 147 This does not mean, however,
that they do not use scripts or have a concept of story and of telling sto-
ries.148 It is communicating that is more difficult: language skills develop
over time; young children may have neither the complex language skills
nor the vocabulary to describe what occurred, or who did what to whom.
A younger child lacks the complex web of connections we develop
through experience and learning to retrieve and communicate an event in
intelligible form. 149 Nor do younger children have the grammar and syn-
tax skills necessary to understand complex or compound questions asked
of them by lawyers.'5 0 Further, a younger child's sense of dates, se-
quences, and time can be quite different from that of adults or older chil-
dren.15' Although older children and adolescents do have better knowl-
edge and abilities to communicate, they are generally not cognitively,
emotionally, or linguistically "just like" adults, even if they seem
"mature" or articulate.152
As a result of well-intentioned but highly suggestive techniques used
by some investigators, egregious cases of out-and-out coercion by others,
and a skepticism toward child witnesses' testimony in general in sexual
abuse cases, researchers and legal actors are subjecting children's testi-
147 Dziech & Schudson, supra note 22, at 69-72; Cathleen A. Carter et al., Linguistic and
Socioeconomic Influences on the Accuracy of Childrens' Reports, 20 Law & Hum. Behav.
335, 336-37 (1996).
148 John H. Flavell et al., Cognitive Development 85-88 (3d ed. 1993). Younger children
may be perplexed if scripts aren't followed, and narratives of rudimentary cause and effect
are easier than conceptual or generalized categorical groupings. Id. Further, "[y]ounger
children are more suggestible because they are overly dependent on scripted knowledge and
incorporate discrepant or novel events (which could be a suggestion) [sic] into their script
of the event rather than keeping them tagged as separate events." Ceci & Bruck, Suggesti-
bility of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 416.
149 Jerome Kagan, The Nature of the Child 224 (10th ed. 1984).
150 See Dziech & Schudson, supra note 22, at 70-72 (summarizing research on language
skill acquisition); Carter et al., supra note 147, at 336-37, 343-47, 349-50.
151 See Dziech & Schudson, supra note 22, at 68-69. The ability to deal with abstract con-
cepts such as time grows as a child matures. Id. at 71.
152 Dziech and Schudson suggest that children, rather than being treated as deviant adults,
ought to be treated on their own terms in court. Id. at 169-72.
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mony to increasingly intense scrutiny. Indeed, a kind of "cognitive
war ' 153 has broken out over the believability of children, shifting the fo-
cus of authorities from direct consideration of the reality of sexual abuse
to bitter fights over memory and reliability.
In an effort to compensate for children's difficulties in communicating
and testifying about sexual abuse, social workers, therapists, and investiga-
tors turned to using "anatomically correct dolls" to enable them to con-
struct a narrative. Although the dolls were introduced in 1978 "to enable
children to identify body parts and functions ... and to demonstrate
and/or clarify what had happened to them," within ten years the dolls be-
came "the focus of heated controversies" about their alleged stimulation of
"sexualized fantasies in children."' 154 Researchers not only argued that the
dolls produced "fantasies" in children, but also condemned their use for
interviewing or investigative purposes, claiming that the dolls fomented
false allegations of sexual abuse.' 55 Claims of falsity, suggestibility, and
damage effectively ended the use of dolls to reinforce children's narra-
tives.
The controversies in culture and law have also affected social science
research on children's testimonial and recall capacities. While much re-
search on children's acquisition of memory skills and strategies had been
done by the 1960s, that research involved testing learning and the ability
to memorize and retain discrete facts, rather than the ability to recall
complex events accurately. 156 By the 1980s, research on children's mem-
ory became increasingly defined by the sexual abuse controversy and the
demand for certainty about the reliability and believability of children's
legal testimony.157 This is not necessarily objectionable, but it does mean
153 Janet Halley suggested this formulation to me.
154 Barbara W. Boat & Mark D. Everson, The Use of Anatomical Dolls in Sexual Abuse
Evaluations: Current Research and Practice, in Child Victims, Child Witnesses: Understand-
ing and Improving Testimony 47, 48-49 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993)
[hereinafter Child Victims, Child Witnesses].
155 Id. at 56-57. There are real advantages to allowing children to communicate through play.
The strident opposition to the use of anatomically correct dolls is unfortunate. At the same time,
however, we must also recognize that the child's communication may not extract the kind of pre-
cise information demanded by the legal system. And if an adult is suggesting---or demonstrat-
ing-how to play, then the communication may have little to do with any particular event and
more to do with pleasing the adult, experimenting, or creating.
156 See, e.g., Flavell et al., supra note 148, at 231-72.
157 Id. at 268-69; Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 408.
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that no relatively independent norms or understandings of memory and
recall development in children existed prior to the focus on the specific
questions of "suggestibility" and factual accuracy in the context of urgent,
adversarial legal demands.' 58
Despite calls for caution in taking absolute positions on children's
ability to recall events and to resist suggestion or adult pressures, 159 posi-
tions in the field of psychology on the ability of children to testify accu-
rately appear to be hardening. One leading researcher, Stephen Ceci,
whose work frequently refers to and emphasizes as paradigmatic the in-
justices and errors of McMartin and Michaels, has increasingly empha-
sized the innocent defendant and the false accusation. In a presentation to
the 1993 APA meeting in Toronto, Canada, Ceci stated:
I also do not make any apologies for being [one who
emphasizes the possibility of false accusations and puts
a pro-defense spin on the data]; my best reading of the
corpus of scientific research leads me to worry about
the possibility of false allegations. It is not a tribute to
one's scientific integrity to walk down the middle of
the road if the data are more to one side. 160
Implying throughout his lecture that children's recall is highly vulner-
able to suggestion and inaccuracy, Ceci did not, however, advocate
barring children from testifying, finding that "the data are somewhat
off-center, though not so egregiously off-center as to discredit children
from testifying."'161 Another expert on child development, on the other
hand, drew a more optimistic conclusion despite recognizing the vul-
158 See Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 403.
159 See McCarthy, supra note 77, at 1, 28-29.
160 Stephen J. Ceci, Cognitive and Social Factors in Children's Testimony, Master Lecture
Presented at APA 4 (Aug. 20, 1993) (transcript on file with author).
161 Id. Ceci became embroiled in the impassioned debate about "false memory" and has
been identified with Elizabeth Loftus and Peter Ornstein, both of whom have strenuously
denied that there is any proof of "repressed memory," asserting instead that recovered
memories are implanted by misguided or malevolent therapists and irresponsible tech-
niques. Though Loftus, Omstein, and Ceci apparently take the position that they are the true
"scientists" in the debate, and that clinicians who assert that repressed memory exists are
not scientific, Ceci's alignment with Loftus is unfortunate at this point. Loftus has resigned
from the APA allegedly because the APA was "turning away from scientific principles."
For a summary, see Barasch, supra note 72, at 1-2.
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nerabilities in children's memories. John Flavell and his co-authors
conclude a review of the research on memory with the observation that
"[e]ven young children ... do not appear to make up memories that
would wrongfully condemn a defendant in a child-abuse case." 62
The existing research on children and memory does demonstrate that
children's ability to recall events accurately and their susceptibility to sug-
gestion vary according to age, cognitive development, adult influence, and
other social and psychological factors. 163 Complicating things further is
so-called "childhood amnesia," an observed and repeated phenomenon in
which children (and adults) have little ability to recall even significant life
events from the first years of life.164
Generally, memories of events, particularly the details of those events,
can decay over time absent repetition or recollective frameworks. Thus,
without rehearsal, anyone's memory of an event fades. Children are un-
likely to have developed the sophisticated recollective capacities of older
adolescents and adults, 165 nor are children any more likely than adults to
mentally rehearse memories of events as a general matter.166 Moreover,
the contexts in which abuse occurs may themselves be chaotic and unpre-
dictable, without cause and effect for the child, so that the child has no
sense of sequence or ordering of events in a way that facilitates memory
and that a journalistic narrative demands. Isolated instances of abuse may
be easier to identify and recall with some specificity than abuse continuing
over a period of time or sexual abuse occurring in a context of frequent
physical or emotional abuse (a likely occurrence).167
162 Flavell et al., supra note 148, at 269.
163 See, e.g., Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 431.
164 See Schacter, supra note 14, at 229. But see Flavell et al., supra note 148, at 234 (noting
that it is unclear whether infantile experiences can be recalled by adolescents or adults,
though infants demonstrate memory capacity over time).
165 Flavell et al., supra note 148, at 245-47.
166 Id. at 237.
167 See generally, Lenore Terr, Too Scared to Cry: Psychic Trauma in Childhood (1990).
Some jurisdictions have dropped the date-specificity requirment for pleading or proof in
cases of continuous child sexual abuse. In California, for example, in order to convict a
defendant for continuous sexual abuse of a child-a crime defined by three or more discrete
instances of sexual abuse-a jury need agree only that acts occurred, not which acts consti-
tute the requisite number to fulfill the crime. Cal. Penal Code § 299.5(b) (West Supp.
1997).
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Further, because some children are admonished by abusers not to tell,
either through bribes or threats, 168 the child may cease to remember much
or any of a sexual assault. Told "not to tell," the child may try to forget
and is quite unlikely to keep refreshing her memory through repetition of
the sequence of events mentally or, if she is old enough, by writing about
the abuse. And while we may believe that there is no way a child can
"forget" abuse, much of the confusion and pain a child experiences might
manifest itself in "I forget," dissociation, or inability to tell the story. 169
Finally, although a first interview or reaction by an adult or authority fig-
ure can affect a child's encoding of the memory, as one researcher has
noted:
"we shouldn't delude ourselves" that the first interview
is done by a professional .... "The mother whose child
says, 'Do you know what Uncle George did to me in
the garage?' does not step back and think, 'Now, let's
see, free-recall is best, and I shouldn't interrupt for 11.3
seconds.' It's more likely there's lots of shrieking
"170
Analyses of children's ability to remember and accurately report
events often get confused with children's susceptibility to suggestion. 17'
Indeed, one way we maintain an interpretation that the child's story is
false, while avoiding blaming or condemning children, is by employing a
narrative that asserts that suggestible children are coached by adults with
their own motives and purposes, ranging from overreaction to vindictive-
ness. Providing intelligible explanations of the world for children and
teaching them is a "natural" adult role, one not easily surrendered because
of the demands of a legal system. Because children generally wish to
please adults and rely on them to make the world intelligible, they can be
168 See Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child
Abuse & Neglect 177, 181-82 (1983) (describing abusers' threats, pleas to child, extraction
of promises to keep secret, and so on, leading a child not to disclose abuse).
169 Claims that adults don't "repress," based in part on studies demonstrating the ability of many
adults to recall war trauma, etc., seem inapposite. That some-many--recall does not prove that
others don't, and an adult's experiences over time enhance their ability to recollect and remember
extreme experiences as distinguished from daily occurrences. See Schacter, supra note 14, at
228-30.
170 McCarthy, supra note 77, at 29.
171 See Carter et al., supra note 147, at 336-39.
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influenced by adults' reactions, leading questions, and by suggestions that
fill gaps in the child's knowledge or recall. 172 Perhaps it is the children's
lack of narrative skills, rather than some more venal purpose, that explains
the impulse of at least some of those working with sexually abused chil-
dren--or children they believe might have been sexually abused-to
"coach" them or to suggest things, rushing to fill in the gaps in a child's
story with adult interpretations.
"Suggestibility" itself can mean a number of things. As Ceci and
Bruck note in their thorough review of the research concerning children's
"eyewitness" recall, "suggestibility concerns the degree to which chil-
dren's encoding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be influ-
enced by a range of social and psychological factors."' 73 While age mat-
ters in sensitivity to adult response, pressures, and phrasing of questions,
"young children were able to accurately recollect the majority of the in-
formation they observed, even though they did not recall as much as older
children. They may be more likely to succumb to erroneous suggestions
than older children, but their vulnerability is a matter of degree only."'174
Yet the vulnerability to suggestion has deeply affected Ceci and Bruck's
conclusions about the reliability of children's testimony regarding sexual
abuse. Thus, they appear to recommend some form of in camera determi-
nation of the credibility of a child's testimony through an examination of
"the conditions prevalent at the time of the child's original report ... in
order to judge the suitability of using that child as a witness in court."' 175 If
any condition is not met, "it ought to raise cautions in the mind of the
court.' 1 7 6 Finally, they suggest that courts consider giving "cautionary
instructions about children's reliability risks,""77 unless the courts believe
172 For example, in the "Sam Stone" experiment, children saw a person about whom they
had been told for a few minutes. They were later asked suggestively over several weeks if
certain things had occurred or if he had been dressed in certain ways. The children reported
that they saw Stone, which was true, but also provided embellishments that were untrue and
responsive to suggestions. Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness, supra note
133, at 416-17.
173 Id. at 404 (emphasis in original).
174 Id. at 433.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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such instructions "may exaggerate jurors' preexisting skepticism of chil-
dren's competencies to a point that is undesirable."' 178
Another interpretation that permits dismissal of a child's word rests on
the claim that children regularly falsify charges of sexual abuse, in much
the same way that women ostensibly lie about rape to gain some advan-
tage. 179 This approach fits comfortably with parental "intuitions" that lead
to off-hand observations that children lie all the time. But, facile state-
ments that "children never lie" or "children always lie" are empirically
false. Children can dissemble strategically, as anyone who has worked
with children is aware; this is perhaps the source of the belief that children
are fabricators or liars or easily led into telling "factually untrue" tales.
Not surprisingly, even young children will misrepresent things to avoid
punishment or gain advantage in specific situations.' 80 And as children
grow older and develop more complex cognitive and communication
skills, they have the capacity to create inherently believable stories of
abuse and make "false" accusations. Some stories of abuse are undoubt-
edly fabrications and manipulations, but that hardly justifies concluding
that children routinely lie about sexual abuse in order to manipulate adults.
What of stories of children "recanting" allegations of sexual abuse--
do they not prove that children lie? Much can be made of recantations by
children of different ages in cases as proof that nothing occurred and the
child lied, as has been the case with recantations by women of rape and
sexual assault complaints. But to assume a recantation is itself "true"
manifests a particular bias away from believing that sexual abuse of chil-
dren occurs. Children are much less likely to have confidence in their per-
ceptions of reality in the face of adult opposition or indifference. As
Summit noted in The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,181
the child is unlikely to find easy acceptance of an assertion of abuse, or a
narrative framework in which to place her experience, leading to uncer-
tainty that the events in question occurred at all. A child faced with adult
challenges to her assertions may decide she is mistaken; adults are power-
178 Id. at 434.
179 See Ann Althouse, Beyond King Solomon's Harlots: Women in Evidence, 65 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1265, 1274-77 (1992); Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, supra note 108, at 162;
Torrey, supra note 109, at 1041.
180 Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 427.
181 Summit, supra note 168, at 181-82.
522
Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse
ful and all-knowing, and thus elaborations, changes, confusion, and re-
traction should hardly surprise us. It is possible, then, that we can draw no
general conclusions at all from recantations. The proper "answer" to the
question of whether children lie about sexual abuse is "it depends." Ceci
and Bruck concluded in one survey, however, that, because of the "horror
story" cases of McMartin and Michaels, and the (unfounded) belief that
juries inevitably believe children's testimony, 182 professionals ought to be
skeptical of claims of sexual abuse and should seek alternative explana-
tions for the children's statements and symptoms. 183
As with rape and sexual harassment, where the victim's own voice is
not enough to secure conviction, and the law may require corrobora-
tion, 184 those involved in child sexual abuse cases (and research) also em-
phasize the need for corroboration and "prompt complaints."'1 85 Providing
corroboration is often difficult, however, because the crimes are typically
committed behind closed doors, and many perpetrators, at least, do not
keep pictorial or written records of their activities. Moreover, the accused
usually strenuously denies the allegations. "Prompt complaints" of abuse
may be unlikely because of the dependency of children on adults, the dif-
ficulty of communicating, and the confusion and denial surrounding many
instances of sexual abuse. 186
182 Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck, Child Witnesses: Translating Research into Policy,
Soc'y for Res. in Child Develop., XX Social Policy Report No. X (1993) [hereinafter
SRCD]. This "folk tale" does not yet have much empirical support. Indeed, juries may dis-
believe older children, particularly girls, who allege abuse. See Michael R. Lieppe et al.,
Discernability or Discrimination?: Understanding Jurors' Reactions to Accurate and Inaccu-
rate Child and Adult Eyewitnesses, in Child Victims, Child Witnesses, supra note 154, at
169, 169-70; Peter K. Isquith et al., Blaming the Child: Attribution of Responsibility to
Victims of Child Sexual Abuse, in Child Victims, Child Witnesses, supra note 154, at 203,
204.
183 Ceci and Bruck, SRCD, supra note 182, at 13.
184 Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, 103-16 (1987); Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 815-16 (1991); Torrey, supra note 109, at 1041.
185 A related issue to the authority of the victim's voice and prompt complaint is the ad-
missibility of hearsay---that is, a child's statement to an adult authority figure--to prove
something occurred. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); cf. Aviva Orenstien, "My
God!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85
Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997) (arguing for statutory modification to allow later state-
merts of abuse as "excited utterances" given studies demonstrating silence as the initial
response to rape).
186 Explaining reasons for delayed reporting are one of the concerns that led Roland
Summit to identify a "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome." See supra note 168
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B. Attempts to Support Children 's Testimony
The discrediting of children's narratives and testimonial abilities is, of
course, only a part of the problem with proving sexual abuse of children.
Important as identifying victims, hearing their stories, and having their
testimony is to a case, other evidence further increases the chances of suc-
cessful prosecution or resolution. But absent "objective" evidence (e.g.,
"hard," tangible, and testable things observable by everyone; or a confes-
sion by the defendant), proof of sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt is
daunting under current conditions. And even with such observable
"things," other stories or explanations often overwhelm a confirmation of
sexual abuse.
When there is a patterned explanation or story for a phenomenon,
people tend, consciously or not, to aggregate information and place it into
the explanatory narrative fiamework, even if that framework doesn't quite
"fit" or when they find the meaning uncomfortable or painful. If the avail-
able information reflects an expected narrative pattern, people will assume
a high probability that the event or phenomenon occurred and fill in nar-
rative gaps by referring to pre-existing frameworks. But where no pre-
existing "format" exists---where no observed, recognized, and recorded
pattern in an agreed-upon narrative exists---there may be a tendency to
disaggregate information, myopically scrutinizing each piece of data and
finding it inadequate to support a thesis or assertion and therefore unwor-
thy of credence. This is particularly true in the child sexual abuse area,
where observers can readily discount, explain away (or more comfortably
explain), or ignore each piece of information and evidence.
1. Physical Evidence
Researchers and other professionals frequently offer many alternative
and benign explanations for such physical evidence as a girl's damaged
hymen or a child's infection with STDs. 8 7 Females, in seeking to over-
and accompanying text. See also Mosteller, supra note 75, at 17-18 (arguing evidence ad-
missible to rehabilitate child if defense impeaches on failure to report the incident
promptly).
187 See, e.g, Douglas J. Besharov, Responding to Child Sexual Abuse: The Need for a Bal-
anced Approach, 4 The Future of Children 135, 150-51 (1994) ("For instance, medical
symptoms such as unusual vaginal or urethral irritations or discharges... can also have an
alternate medical explanation or they can be the result of excessive rubbing (during clean-
ing), poor hygiene, or self-stimulation. And it is often impossible to tell which it is."). A
recent, and tragic, example of the interpretation (or lack of interpretation) of physical evi-
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come the enormous disadvantages historically associated with the lack of
an intact hymen, suddenly find the alternative explanations for its absence
used to explain away a female child's claim of molestation. And, although
it appears that the presence of some forms of sexually transmitted disease
provide "medical certainty" of abuse, 88 the presence of other sexually
transmitted diseases in a child ostensibly has alternative explanations.' 8 9
Similarly, alternative explanations exist for other types of evidence in
child sexual abuse cases, including children's behavior, drawings, and use
of language, all of which re-enforce the tendency to disbelieve allegations.
Indeed, an alternative explanation existed for each piece of evidence
in the case I described earlier in this Essay. Attorneys, investigators, and
others with whom I spoke used these alternative interpretations to dismiss
each piece of evidence and then opined that the case could not be proven.
The child's statements and the terms she used for physical parts were ex-
plained away. Ironically, if a child uses euphemisms for genitals, there is a
claim the child has no sexual knowledge and therefore cannot have been
abused; if the child uses technical terms, then the claim is that she was
coached or that in this liberated day and age, children learn the proper
terms. Her drawings could be interpreted in a number of ways, many of
which were benign or dismissive. According to one person involved in the
case, the man's elusive admissions, as long as they weren't out-and-out
confessions, were not "proof;" he always had a plausible alternative ex-
planation or characterization of whatever had happened. The physical evi-
dence apparently was "inconclusive" as well. Although the child had a
damaged hymen, entirely consistent with child sexual abuse, a doctor
would have to testify that there could be "other reasons" for the dam-
dence of injury is the case of JonBenet Ramsey, a little girl who was murdered in Boulder,
Colorado. A District Judge "released portions of the autopsy," on February 14, 1997. James
Brooke, Part of Autopsy Is Released in Slaying of Colorado Girl, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1997, at 10. The evidence prompted a denial from the child's pediatrician that no prior evi-
dence of any abuse existed. A "chronic inflammation," "which could be an indication of
prior sexual abuse," led the doctor to say "he never saw any indication that [the girl] was
sexually abused." Autopsy: Ramsey was Strangled, The Herald-Times (Bloomington, IN),
Feb. 15, 1997, at A2; Doctor Denies JonBenet was Abused, The Herald Times
(Bloomington, IN), Feb. 16, 1997, at A3.
188 David L. Kems et al., The Role of Physicians in Reporting and Evaluating Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 4 The Future of Children 119, 129 (1994).
189 Id.
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age. 190 No one appeared to step back and look at all the pieces taken to-
gether, at least when talking to me, as constituting parts of an interlocking
narrative that would create a strong legal case against the man.
2. Syndrome Evidence and Uncharged Conduct
To combat children's inability to provide a believable narrative, and
the tendency to interpret the statements of children and physical evidence
in a "benign" light, prosecutors and legislatures have tried to supplement
or bolster the children's testimony in a number of ways, including the use
of "syndrome" evidence and uncharged conduct. Yet many of these at-
tempts have also failed. The following excerpt from a book by an adult
incest survivor who finally reported her father to the police after discover-
ing that he had continued to abuse his daughters and grandchild illustrates
some of the difficulties an accused faces when trying to prove sexual
abuse within the constraints of current law and understanding:
First you had to deal with your own abuse, figure out
how to admit that it happened, come out of the com-
fortable cocoon of denial, confront the issue, the shame,
and the risk of Dad's wrath. Then you had to convince
the social worker and the police that you had a prob-
lem. Then you had to put together a case, wait a year,
have the judge rule that Cee Cee's charges under Cali-
fornia law did not qualify as rape and that Diedre and
Anne's counts exceeded the six-year statute of limita-
tions .... The judge had also ruled that Keely's thera-
pist could not testify regarding Keely's behavior or any
conversations she'd had with Keely.191
190 Given these difficulties of proof in a criminal case, one might wonder why the prosecu-
tor ever charged the man and why the matter wasn't simply handled through a dependency
proceeding, where the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Dependency
proceedings do not entail termination of parental rights, which triggers a higher burden of
proof, nor incarceration of the parent, and one need not worry about convincing a jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt that abuse occurred. I don't have an answer to this question; per-
haps the difficulties of proving sexual abuse in any context remain the same at this time.
Certainly there appears to be a heightened scrutiny of such claims in the custody context
and a tendency to disbelieve assertions of sexual abuse. Perhaps the same is true of depend-
ency cases.
191 Donna L. Friesse, Cry the Darkness 262-63 (1993).
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During the first two weeks of the trial, the new judge
ruled that a major portion of the evidence was inad-
missible. No mention of the histories of the noncharge
victims could be entered. None of Dad's photographs
of partially nude children ... could be entered... In
fact ... if any of us so much as uttered a word about
our own abuse in from of the jury, it would result in a
mistrial. 192
A number of prosecutorial strategies to overcome the difficulties of
proving child sexual abuse have met with resistance that initially appears
consistent with concerns for due process and evidentiary fairness. But
when examined in light of the acceptance of similar approaches outside
the area of sexual assault and gender violence, such resistance suggests
that the strength of these fairness concerns depends on how well the
prosecution can tap into an accepted narrative of wrongdoing, harm, or
"badness."
Since the early 1980s, prosecutors have introduced expert testimony in
selected sexual assault cases to provide an authoritative narrative for the
victim by explaining the victim's behavior and providing an interpretive
account of sexual abuse in the form of "syndrome" evidence. Thus, "Rape
Trauma Syndrome" evidence is admissible in some rape cases in order to
provide corroboration, explanation, and rehabilitation for a victim's
story.193 Prosecutors similarly have attempted to introduce evidence of
"Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" in cases involving
child sexual abuse. 194 But efforts to use expert testimony about "Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" or "Child Sexual Abuse Syn-
drome" to corroborate a victim's story have met with considerable resis-
tance.195
192 Id. at 261.
193 See, e.g., State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982) (admissible when consent is
the defense); People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 132 (N.Y. 1990) (admissible to explain
responses and to rebut myths). Many courts refuse to admit RTS evidence, however; others
have admitted it to establish a woman was not raped. See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189
(Ind. 1989).
194 Askowitz & Graham, supra note 75, at 2034-35, 2042-44, 2048-51, 2058-62.
195 See, e.g., State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 496-502 (N.J. Super. 1993), affd, 642 A.2d
1372 (1994); Comment, Restricting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions: Pennsylvania Takes It to the Extreme, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 201, 204-5
(1992).
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Originally identified by Roland Summit in 1983,196 Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) was a descriptive explana-
tion of why children failure to report abuse and why they might "recant"
or change their stories. Investigators, therapists, and medical professionals
began to use the list of behaviors found by Summit to be associated with
the syndrome and child sexual abuse to diagnose children as victims for
courts, although that was not Summit's purpose in identifying the syn-
drome.' 97 Summit's work demonstrating the reality of and reasons for a
child's delayed reporting of sexual abuse did support lengthening statutes
of limitations for child sexual abuse charges by taking into account the
difficulties of any formal or informal "prompt complaint" requirement. 198
But the lengthening of statutes of limitations to accommodate a child's
development and ability to recount an intelligible story creates fertile
ground for attacks on children's memory and suggestibility. 199 And be-
cause the category was not designed for dispositive diagnosis, but rather to
increase understanding among those working with children, courts be-
came increasingly skeptical of any testimony based on child sexual abuse
syndromes. 200
Many of the common objections legal scholars have invoked to op-
pose the introduction of expert testimony on "syndrome" evidence gen-
erally apply equally to CSAAS, including the claims that the syndrome is
based on "anecdotal" or "soft" data and that expert testimony unduly in-
196 Summit, supra note 168, at 177.
197 "The purpose of this paper... is to provide a vehicle for a more sensitive, more thera-
peutic response to legitimate victims of child sexual abuse and to invite more active, more
effective clinical advocacy for the child within the family and within the systems of child
protection and criminal justice." Id. at 179-80.
198 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509k (1994); Ala. Code § 15-3-5(a)(4)(1995); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 16-5-401 (1986 & Supp. 1996); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.080 (Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 939.74 (West 1996 & Supp. 1996). Statutes tolling until discovery: Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-107 (1989); Okla. Star. Ann. Tit. 22 § 152 (West Supp. 1997); until age sixteen:
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.15(7) (West Supp. 1997); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 277, § 63 (West
1994); until age eighteen: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-109(h)) (1993); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 720,
para. 5/3-6(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.095 (Supp. 1995); N.J. Rev.
Stat. § 2C: 1-6-b(4) (1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-30 (Michie Supp. 1995).
199 As the above excerpt suggests, many cases still fall outside the specified statutes of limita-
tions.
200 See State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.3. 1993); Michaels, 625 A.2d at 496-502
(summarizing objections and other court opinions).
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fluences juries.20 1 If the source of testimony about sexual abuse accom-
modation syndrome is a therapist or a clinician, her testimony is likely to
be discounted, because clinical observations are not considered
"scientific" enough.202 Some critics claim clinicians and social workers
routinely over-diagnose sexual abuse,20 3 although the research thus far
indicates the opposite.204 Moreover, two leading research psychologists
have stated that:
The mental health professional who testifies on the di-
agnosis of sexual abuse or who describes to a court the
symptoms associated with sexual abuse must also take
into consideration competing hypotheses that might
explain why the child in question, or children in gen-
eral, demonstrate particular symptoms or make allega-
tions of sexual abuse.205
These commentators have identified a significant problem with the
current definitions of CSAAS in diagnosing sexual abuse. Many of the
behavioral symptoms identified as evidence of sexual abuse in children-
such as sleeping disorders, eating problems, regression to earlier behav-
201 See, e.g., Gary Melton, Doing Justice and Doing Good: Conflicts for Mental Health
Professionals, 4 The Future of Children 102, 112 (1994); Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific"
Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 Farn. L.Q. 383, 393-94 (1989). This is also
Ceci and Bruck's position. See Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child
Witness, supra note 133, at 424. I have always wondered why commentators persist in the
belief that psychological and psychiatric experts regularly hoodwink awe-struck juries.
Given the societal suspicion of mental health professionals and mocking of defense-related
psychological claims in criminal cases, it is difficult for me to believe that juries cave in to
"soft" expert testimony.
202 Id.
203 Diana Younts, Note, Evaluating and Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 41 Duke L.J. 691, 692 (1991).
204 Id. While there are undoubtedly individual practitioners who do over-diagnose sexual abuse,
there are also practitioners who "over-diagnose" a number of other disorders--such as
"schizophrenia," "borderline" personality disorder, or "sociopathic" personality disorder-with no
strong societal objection, suggesting that something else may be happening here. Schizophrenia,
for example, was the diagnosis of almost every person I represented in civil commitment hearings
in 1981, despite the fact that many may have suffered from other disorders such as manic-
depression (bi-polar), autism, etc. The term "borderline" was commonly attributed to people suf-
fering from the effects of severe trauma. Dr. Grigson's unwavering diagnosis of sociopathic or
antisocial personality of capital defendants has not met either social or judicial disapprobation. See
infra note 214 and accompanying text.
205 Ceci & Bruck, SRCD, supra note 182, at 15.
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iors, new fears, changes in school performance, or sexual preoccupation-
are maddeningly vague and are applicable to other forms of abuse, ne-
glect, and trauma. This may stem from the fact that children may have a
more limited repertoire of responses than adults. The symptoms, there-
fore, remain open to a number of interpretations, and, again, a more
"benign"-or at least less disturbing--interpretation may replace the one
suggesting sexual abuse.206 Of course, in combination .with other forms of
evidence, these symptoms should be probative. But detached from other
pieces of evidence and without a narrative to give the syndrome credibil-
ity, it is easy to justify excluding CSAAS testimony.
Some commentators have gone farther with their critique of CSAAS,
however. They assert that because "symptoms associated with sexual
abuse (delayed reporting, retraction of the allegation, inconsistent ac-
counts, inappropriate knowledge of sexual behavior, or unusual play with
anatomically correct dolls) have been observed in nonabused children
who have been exposed to suggestive influences," 20 7 mental health pro-
fessionals and courts should be wary of concluding that a child has been
sexually abused.208 One can wonder how researchers can know with cer-
tainty that children have not been sexually abused given the lack of any
recognition that reliable criteria for identifying abused children exist. Note
also that once again, suggestibility becomes the explanation for children's
symptoms of and reactions to sexual abuse, placing the false accusation
meta-narrative in the foreground of these cases. And even if
"suggestibility" does not carry the normative condemnation of a claim of
fabrication, it nevertheless deflects attention away from the reality that
children are in fact abused.
Standard prosecutorial and legal measures have also largely failed to
overcome the basic presumption against child sexual abuse. A number of
legal reasons, including due process and concerns about prejudice, stifle
the use of uncharged priors under a kind of "sexual predator/pattern or
206 Deflection from adult involvement or responsibility for a child's distress occurs when
certain symptoms that may indicate many different problems are linked with self-inflicted
problems. For example, anyone familiar with those supposedly informative advertisements
listing "symptoms" of drug abuse in teenagers, should note that the identified symptoms can
also apply to depression, distress caused by parental drug or alcohol abuse, or several other
problems. See also Besharov, supra note 187, at 151.
207 Ceci & Bruck, SRCD, supra note 182, at 15.
208 Id.
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practice" theory.209 Yet some skepticism about these concerns is probably
in order in the context of child sexual abuse, especially considering that
courts have allowed defendants to introduce evidence of a child victim's
"prior sexual conduct" to demonstrate that the victim has fabricated the
charges.210 In prosecutions of adult rape, modem rape shield laws now
limit the admission of such victim's sexual history evidence.
Even when a court does admit uncharged prior conduct to prove a
pattern or practice of abuse under a theory of identification or modus op-
erandi, or under a specific statute, any testimonial evidence will be un-
dermined by disbelief and attacks on the credibility of the witnesses at
trial. Even though adults and older children may be far more articulate
witnesses, and can perhaps provide a coherent narrative of abuse, the
fierce attacks on memory, combined in some cases with irresponsible
therapeutic interventions, may sharply undermine the usefulness of other
victims' testimony.
3. Unauthorized Sources of Knowledge
Generally, the legal system privileges some epistemological claims
over others and is rigorously positivist. Accordingly, the insistence on
objective, observable facts in legal cases precludes the use of so-called
subjective knowledge as evidence; such knowledge is relegated to the
realm of the "not real," unless some exception exists. "Vibes" are not sci-
entific and cannot be studied in a laboratory; positive science cannot af-
firm their veracity, reliability, or source. Thus, experience, opinion, or
hunch is not credible evidence of anything, whether it comes in the form
of clinical evaluation or intuition, law enforcement suspicion, or individ-
ual experience. Yet when there are identifiable "profiles" or accepted sto-
ries about how to substantiate a hunch, the law often allows hunches to
provide a foundation for legal action, under the pretense of objectivity.
209 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 413-415 (1995); Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1338-39
(Ind. 1992) (striking down "depraved sexual instinct exception" allowing evidence of un-
charged acts in favor of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). See also Katherine A. Baker, Once a Rapist?
Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1997)
(discussing and criticizing admission of prior acts under F.R.E. 413); Harriet Chiang, De-
fense Lawyers Protest Sexual Assault Statute, S.F. Chron., July 27, 1996, at Al 5 (new Cali-
fornia law allowing introduction of evidence of past sexual offenses even if they did not
result in conviction).
210 Christopher B. Reid, Note, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a Basis for the
Admissibility of a Child Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 827,
842-50 (1993).
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As noted above, many critics resist the admission of clinical evalua-
tions by mental health professionals of children's sexual abuse claims,
arguing that the evaluations are not scientific. That courts and commenta-
tors have attacked the admissibility or validity of clinical judgments by
psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers about a variety of phe-
nomena is hardly confined to the child sexual abuse area, of course. 21'
Attacks on clinicians' expertise pervade the literature on civil commit-
ment, battered women, rape trauma, "diminished capacity," and determi-
nations of dangerousness in death penalty cases.212 When clinical testi-
mony runs counter to our comfortable narrative beliefs about how the
world works or how people behave, courts are reluctant to admit it. Thus,
the tendency to disbelieve and the frequently emphasized narratives of
outrageous prosecutions provide an often unacknowledged background
for excluding such testimony as invalid. Yet courts routinely admit clini-
cian's testimony if it confirms existing beliefs, assumptions, and stories, as
it does in the civil commitment and death penalty cases.2 13 In the specific
context of child sexual abuse, however, the combination of "horror story"
literature, claims of overdiagnosis, and cases illustrating clinicians' and
social workers' botched or malevolent manipulations all reinforce back-
ground stories of distrust and disbelief that allow for the exclusion of psy-
chiatric testimony.214
211 One example is the early testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome. For attacks on bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence, see Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev.
1, 4-5 (1994); David Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A
Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 Va. L. Rev. 619, 622 (1986).
212 See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 211 (battered women); Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil
Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment
Standard, 102 Yale L.J. 639 (1992) (criticizing deference to professionals in mental health
law); Mosteller, supra note 75 (criticizing Battered Women's Syndrome).
213 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897-905 (1983) (upholding psychiatric tes-
timony predicting dangerousness in the penalty phase of capital cases). But see Steven R.
Smith & Robert G. Meyer, Law, Behavior, and Mental Health: Policy and Practice 607-12
(1987) (criticizing the admissibility of psychiatric evidence to show likelihood of future
dangerousness in both death penalty sentencing and civil commitment proceedings); Bruce
J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 693, 696 (1974) (criticizing the admission of psy-
chiatric testimony to resolve issues of civil confinement).
214 See, e.g., State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489 (1993), aff'd, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994). Ceci &
Bruck repeatedly point to Michaels as a paradigm. See, e.g., Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility
of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 403-04; Ceci & Bruck, SRCD, supra note 182, at 17.
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Resistance to law enforcement intuitions rests on somewhat different
grounds, as honoring law enforcement hunches and suspicions presents
enormous dangers to individual liberty and safety. Allowing the police to
act on hunches invites intrusion and invasion into citizen's lives; thus, we
require law enforcement officers to point to objective, observable, non-
subjective facts under the rubrics of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause before they may take action. Although "reasonable suspicion" based
on "profiles" or observable behavior is often no more than hunch,215 we
still insist on a formalized articulation of "facts" that others can consider
in determining whether a claim is objectively plausible or "true" before
we condone a given law enforcement action.
Informally, law enforcement officers act on hunches and suspicions all
the time and make up post-hoc reasons to justify the hunches, as anyone
who has worked in criminal justice knows.216 But in child sexual abuse
cases, as with domestic violence cases and perhaps with child abuse cases
generally, police appear to feel quite constrained. In the case in which I
was involved, the police did not act despite the fact that a number of offi-
cers had been suspicious of the man for some time. As no "profile" of
abusers exists, there wasn't anything they could do. Again, the lack of an
acceptable narrative, in this instance an agreed-upon cluster of sights,
sounds, objects, and other information about abusers, became a reason not
to believe or investigate a possible reality. No profile exists: first, because
the subject has not been studied much at all; second, because of the diffi-
culty of identifying perpetrators caused by the context of denial that sur-
rounds child sexual abuse, those studies that do exist are of the relatively
few offenders who have been convicted; and third, because the focus of
many of the studies has been on developing efficacious treatments of
identified perpetrators rather than on piecing together a perpetrator pro-
215 The so-called "drug courier profile" cases provide an excellent example of court approval of
law enforcement's one-size-fits-all criteria. See U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1581, 1583-87
(1989); U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.l (1980). A study by the N.I.J. in the early
1980's found "nearly half' of searches following a determination by DEA agents that airline
travelers exhibited suspicious behavior and/or demographic characteristics resulted in the
finding of some evidence of illegal activity. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Sci-
ence in Law: Cases and Materials 340-341 (2d ed. 1990).
216 Cf. Morgan Claud, Judges, "Testifying," and the Constitution, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1341,
1355-87 (arguing that ostensibly -objective" tests provide officers with incentives to lie in
search and seizure cases, and noting widespread "police perjury").
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file.217 Additionally, it may be that most sexual abusers, like batterers and
rapists, are not distinguishable from non-abusers in any significant way.
Finally, what might be termed a sixth sense or intuition that some
abuse victims seem to develop, alerting them to the potential abuse of oth-
ers, has no recognized valance, and thus does not "count" as knowledge
worthy of belief. My certainty that the neighbor was sexually abusing the
little girl, based on refracted associations with sound (certain intonations
and things he said, but especially the inhuman cry), tone, and emotion
from a long-ago childhood, had no empirical anchor and no basis in
"objective" reality. At the same time, of course, I could easily have been
completely wrong; I absolutely do not advocate intuition as the sole basis
for legal action. Yet perhaps we could develop some acceptance of this
form of specialized knowledge out of a narrative understanding of the
characteristics of sexual abuse, against which the intuition's accuracy
could be gauged.
V. DISABLING THE NARRATIVE
If an established narrative understanding of child sexual abuse existed,
pieces of evidence that supported that interpretation might cumulatively
"prove" that a particular child in a particular case was abused. If we could
interpret evidence of the child's behavior, statements, and evaluations, in
addition to the child's drawings and other physical evidence, as probative
of whether sexual abuse had occurred, then we could justify a conviction
in a criminal case, a finding of dependency in a juvenile case, or an award
of custody to the non-abusing parent in a custody case. Yet this opens up
the question, "why act at all?" Thus far, this question has been answered
in two ways that put children at risk: a deflection of attention away from
the harm of sexual abuse to the potential overreaching of state action and
its associated harms; and a resort to a meta-narrative of "no harm" con-
ceming child sexual abuse.
A. Suspicion of State Power
The focus of attention on the harm caused by taking legal action in
cases of suspected child sexual abuse has come in the form of narratives
217 Judith Becker, Offenders: Characteristics and Treatment, 4 The Future of Children 176
(1994).
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of suspicion of state power, the damage caused by an adversary legal
process to children, and, in cases involving dependency proceedings and
custody, the harm to children of removing them from the home or deny-
ing them contact with a parent.2 18 These narratives are often buoyed by an
ever-growing rhetoric and narrative that attack feminist efforts to end sex-
ual abuse generally.
There are strong narratives against--and fears of--state overreaching
and intrusion into private lives, fears that are empirically grounded in to-
talitarian realities and law enforcement abuses. Yet these concerns only
receive serious attention in the criminal law context when voiced by
members of dominant groups, rather than by those who are subordinated
by the state's power. The frequent solicitude of judges, legislators, and
commentators to the rights of defendants in rape and child molestation
cases, for example, stands in sharp contrast to concern for the rights of
most defendants in other criminal cases.
B. Use of the Rights of the Accused
The power of moral conventionalism and of the status quo has been
rediscovered in the rights of the accused, and concern for these rights has
been weighed against the use of the law to combat child sexual abuse. For
a particularly blatant twisting of ostensible concern for rights, a U.S. News
and World Report article, after alleging a "radical feminist" connection to
efforts to end child sexual abuse, asserts in shocked tones: "Due process is
sometimes thrown to the wind: For $10.00 and the name of an alleged
perpetrator, one organization will inform neighbors, police and local em-
ployers without the accused (sic) having ever to be named. ' 219 That per-
sons accused of other crimes--say, purported drug dealers-do not re-
ceive such solicitous concern from the media suggests that our culture's
resistance to acknowledging the actuality, or perhaps even the immorality,
of sexual abuse of children is still quite strong.
218 Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care,
and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 625 (1976), discusses claims and
abuses, while arguing for a preference that children remain in the home. To my knowledge,
the basic framework of the debate has not substantially changed since this important article
appeared.
219 Horn, supra note 81, at 21.
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"Progressive" social commentators have also used due process con-
cers to dismiss the issue of child sexual abuse instead of taking it seri-
ously. In the words of Murray Edelman, for example, when concerns
about child sexual abuse started coming to light, "child abuse was consti-
tuted as an urgent problem with the result that psychologists, police offi-
cials, teachers, physicians, and neighbors all found that it could bolster
their authority, and district attorneys tried to build political careers on the
prosecution of alleged abusers. '220 As a general rule, we don't speak of
"alleged robbers" or "alleged dope dealers" or "alleged burglars," but
"alleged rapist" and "alleged child abuser" pervade the lexicon. The re-
duction of "abuser" to "alleged abuser," together with Edelman's imme-
diate rhetorical appeal to hidden suspicions of "authorities," fears of
authoritarian control, and stories of nosy neighbors, further illustrate the
deflection of our attention from a terrible reality. Edelman claims that
child abuse,
like drug abuse and the Soviet threat, offers opportuni-
ties for controlling the behaviors and the language of
large numbers of people who wield little power and
may be suspect on other grounds; a focus on the prob-
lem reinforces established inequalities ... [while a] se-
rious effort to deal with homelessness ... would entail
a reexamination of established economic and social
institutions and so might threaten existing power ine-
qualities[.]221
Edelman's deflection from the harm of child sexual abuse to the threat
of power inequalities helps enable the reader to maintain the long-
standing story that child sexual abuse is rare or harmless.
Edelman does rightly observe that resorting to the criminal law makes
it look as if political and legal actors are taking care of a problem simply
by increasing the monitoring of outsiders, rather than actually dealing with
the problem itself.222 Yet it is just as mistaken to deny that evil exists or
simply cede the criminal law to entrenched narratives. That misguided,
inept, and destructive prosecutions have occurred ought not cause us to
220 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle 21 (1988).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 24.
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turn away from facing the real horror of child sexual abuse. Distressingly,
however, the horror itself remains contested.
C. Difficulties in Studying the Effects of Child Sexual Abuse
As exemplified by Child Loving, many "authorities" still deny that the
effects of sexual abuse are devastating to the victims; 223 others argue that,
compared to other forms of abuse, the overall effect of sexual abuse is not
significant enough to merit expending massive resources to address it. The
narratives remain that children are sexual and seek sexual contact with
adults with little harm, 224 or that it is the reaction of adults to and conse-
quences of a child's report of sexual abuse that harms them. 225 The prob-
len of examining the damaging effects of child sexual abuse is com-
pounded by the denial that it exists in any significant way, the attack on
clinical and anecdotal reports and narratives by survivors, the resistance to
claims of sexual abuse by women generally, and the very real fact that the
subject can often only be studied indirectly. Thus claims about harm have
to be somewhat tentative, because we simply do not "know" enough yet,
either in terms of "objective, empirical facts" or in terms of victims' nar-
ratives (themselves a "fact"). 226 Moreover, it is often difficult to separate
the effects of sexual abuse from the effects of other forms of abuse and
223 Haugaard & Reppucci, supra note 42, at 69, 73-76, 97-98 (summarizing clinical and
empirical studies indicating no harm or little harm). Richard Green, Sexual Science and the
Law 148-50 (1992). Green, in a letter protesting a book review describing his position as
being that "'we have no reliable psychiatric evidence that [child-adult sexual] relations
harm children,"' stated that he simply reported the findings of 1986 and 1991 "reviews" that
raised doubts about harm. Green states: "'Not all reports ... document harm."' Richard
Green, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times Book Review, Feb. 28, 1993, at 34 (emphasis in
original).
224 See supra note 130.
225 This varies from claims that exposing children to the trauma of interviews/interrogation
is damaging to the criticisms of the harm done children by removing them from the home or
"breaking up the family." Others persist in arguing there is "nothing... inherently wrong
with nonviolent, noncoerced sexual relations between adults and children, and that society's
reaction is generally the sole cause of the negative consequences .... " Haugaard & Rep-
pucci, supra note 42, at 81-82. In the case in which I was involved, the state having jurisdic-
tion over the child had a mandatory family reunification policy; "reunification" is a current
popular goal in cases of abuse and neglect.
226 Id. at 60-64, 82-84; Crewdson, supra note 22, at 207-10; John N. Briere & Diana M.
Elliot, Immediate and Long-Term Impacts of Child Sexual Abuse, 4 The Future of Children
54, 54-64 (1994).
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neglect.227 At least in the case of families in which sexual abuse takes
place, the sexual abuse is unlikely to exist in isolation from other forms of
abuse, and, indeed, emotional and/or physical abuse can confound the ef-
fects. Thus, the "causes" of harm cannot be isolated sufficiently to be
studied separately. But to conclude that this difficulty makes study im-
possible is to dismiss the harm; to conclude that there has been no harm
would be grave error.
The costs of the sexual abuse of children may be staggeringly high.
Psychologically, economically, and socially, sexual violation of adults and
older adolescents causes them enormous harm, and there is no reason to
believe that sexual violation does less harm to children simply because
they are younger. The following summary speaks primarily of the harms
to females, because less information about the effects of sexual abuse on
boys exists.228 Although the Freudian narrative of the harms done by the
engulfing mother has some cultural valance, 229 and background narratives
supporting homophobia include the premise that sexual abuse of boys by
men is a terrible evil, less empirical research or survivor narrative exists as
of now.230 Second, it appears that girls suffer a rate of sexual abuse twice
that of boys throughout childhood and adolescence, although both genders
experience abuse at an intolerably high rate.231 Finally, as Robin West has
pointed out in a different context, males do not live under a life-long
threat of sexual abuse, while females remain under the threat of sexual
violence and exploitation throughout their lives.2 32
Sexual abuse of children may cause a number of difficulties for indi-
vidual women, as well as reinforce gender inequalities. I say it "may"
227 See generally Haugaard & Reppucci, supra note 42, at 60-100.
228 See David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual
Abuse, 4 The Future of Children 31, 46-48 (1994).
229 In an excellent psychoanalytic book by Leonard Shengold on the effects of various
kinds of abuse on children, the discussions of sexual abuse are framed by Freudian Oedipal
theory and abuse by mothers, never fathers or other male figures, of boys. Shengold, supra
note 38, at 41-68.
230 To the extent that information exists, it appears that the harmful effects on boys are similar to
the harms for girls, except that male sexual abuse victims may be more likely than female victims
to become abusers themselves. Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of
Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 228, at 46-47.
231 See id. at 46.
232 West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 2, at 107.
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cause because of the historical failure to recognize that child sexual abuse
occurs with any frequency and that it might have harmful effects. Even
recently, when presented with evidence of widespread sexual abuse of
girls, some conscientious researchers have failed to consider what long-
term effects the abuse might have on women's lives. The authors of
Women 's Ways of Knowing, for example, are maddeningly silent about
the significance for their conclusions about women's learning and cogni-
tive styles of their finding that thirty-eight percent of the women they
contacted in colleges and schools in their study--and sixty-five percent of
the college-age women they contacted through social agencies--reported
prior incidents of "incest, rape, or sexual seduction by a male in authority
over them--fathers, uncles, teachers, doctors, clerics, bosses." 233 A cur-
sory glance at their data suggests a connection between what they term
"silent women"--the women least "sophisticated" cognitively---and a
history of abuse, but the authors do not develop this connection.234
Existing research does support the thesis that sexual abuse of girls can
produce a number of harms over the course of a victim's lifetime, al-
though I cannot claim any direct "causal" connection between sexual
abuse and particular harms to women's lives, because multiple factors in-
teract to produce effects in a single woman. Diana Russell's study sug-
gests that incest and sexual abuse can have life-long effects on women's
lives, including an increased likelihood of divorce, lower socio-economic
status, subsequent sexual assaults, rape, and violence.235 It may be that
early abuse renders females more vulnerable to subsequent abuse, al-
though we must be careful not to assume a "damaged goods" causal rela-
tionship. 236 Some studies indicate that a great number of prostitutes and
performers in pornography were sexually abused when they were girls.2 3 7
233 Mary Field Belenky et al., Women's Ways of Knowing 58-59 (1986).
234 Id. at 23-24, 158-60.
235 Russell, supra note 43, at 157-67, 194-99.
236 To conclude with some that sexual abuse so devastates a child that she is doomed to a
life of suffering would be erroneous, as many who were abused can have productive and
happy lives. The extent of harm undoubtedly depends on the nature and extent of the abuse,
the individual's characteristics and opportunities, and other factors. That many women are
not destroyed by sexual abuse hardly means that it does not harm, however.
237 Mary E. Gilfus, From Victims to Survivors to Offenders: Women's Routes of Entry and
Immersion into Street Crime, 4 Women & Crim. Just. 63, 78-87 (1992); Crewdson, supra
note 22, at 208.
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Further, and linked to prostitution and pornography, there may be a rela-
tionship between drug and alcohol addiction of women and a history of
sexual abuse.238 With the resurgence of societal interest in the "bad
mother," a woman who fails to protect her children from abuse by a man
may be considered as blameworthy as the man, even if she herself was
abused or continues to be abused.239 Yet women who try to protect their
children from suspected abuse are themselves suspect and accused of ly-
ing, especially in divorce and custody cases; at times, women are crimi-
nally prosecuted or held in contempt for hiding their children and/or refus-
ing to cooperate with authorities. 240 Unfortunately, there are also adults
who were sexually abused by caretakers or parents who remain silent as
their abuser abuses the next generation.241 Therefore, to dismiss concern
about child sexual abuse would be to abandon efforts--egal and other-
wise-to identify offenders and victims, to prevent and reduce the fre-
quency of harms to many individuals, and to respond constructively to a
terrible reality. The remainder of this Essay suggests some ways in which
we might overcome the current impasse through developing narrative and
understanding.
VI. THE USE OF NARRATIVES IN CLAIMS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Developing sound narratives of sexual abuse in the face of opposition
is no easy task; even when the narrators are articulate adults supported by
238 Crewdson, supra note 22, at 208. In turn, women who use drugs and/or alcohol who are also
pregnant become a focus for state power and punishment. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L.
Rev. 1419, 1420-21 (1991).
239 Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Tex. J.
Women & L. 75 (1993); Naomi R. Calm, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1041 (1991).
240 The most widely known case, perhaps, is that of Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, who spent two
years in jail in contempt of court rather than reveal the whereabouts of her daughter, Hilary,
and rather than comply with a court order to allow Hilary's father unsupervised visitation.
Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond
Contempt, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 491, 491-493 (1989). A private bill in Congress led to Dr.
Morgan's release; Hilary had been taken to New Zealand, in the meantime, where a court
gave her grandparents custody. See Rosen & Etlin, supra note 76, at 2-96 (case histories);
Dziech & Schudson, supra note 22, at 202-06.
241 Friesse, supra note 191, is only one case study, but it is a troubling one, as the adult
daughters of an extremely abusive man used a number of strategies of denial and avoidance
before finally acting against him.
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volumes of empirical support, law resists deviations from its accepted nar-
ratives, as demonstrated by the painfully slow legal progress in responding
to the extensive testimonies and empirical literature on rape. When the
narrators are traumatized children or adults struggling to recapture and
communicate painful and terrifying memories, the prospects for success in
eliciting efficacious legal responses seem even more remote. But that does
not mean success is impossible, if we commit ourselves to conscientious
listening, analysis, and exploration of alternatives.
The next step is not to abandon narratives of abuse by children or
adults in the wake of the political, psychological, and media attacks on
these stories. Individual testimonies are vital to understanding. No re-
searcher can ethically replicate or reproduce the cognitive, emotional, or
physical effects of sexual abuse; but if we are to understand those effects,
and to have even a partial narrative to displace the narratives of denial and
deflection, we need to hear from those affected. We need to provide safe
ways of telling, and we need to develop sensitive ways to interview and
record experiences-not only should we worry about "suggestibility," but
we also need to worry about efforts to suppress telling.
The inductive method of observing repeated phenomena is a standard
way to begin scientific and social scientific inquiry. Repeated observation
of the particular allows for generalizations that may then be tested. Induc-
tion is a perfectly respectable and scientific way to apprehend the world,
both in terms of gathering data and in terms of generating hypotheses
about the world, and, in this instance, gathering information through in-
dividual accounts is indispensable. Thus, individual narratives ought to be
heard, read, listened to, and studied. Analysis of a broad sample of narra-
tives ought to reveal patterns that in turn may provide a narrative frame-
work that can support the believability of claims of abuse.
We also need to develop information about those who commit child
sexual abuse. Some of this information obviously will come from victim
narratives; some will come from those involved in criminal justice and
child protection work. Currently, we know very little and, thus, stereo-
typic images of "child molesters" provide a narrative that excludes many
offenders from consideration. ("He's a good citizen; he doesn't look like a
pervert.")
At the same time, actual cases cannot simply be abandoned "until we
know more." Certainly, stereotypes of perpetrators as identifiable deviants
have to be overcome by educating prosecutors, judges, and juries as much
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as possible in light of what we know, including indications that race and
socioeconomic status are not predictors of sexual abuse.242 More impor-
tantly, we must watch out for the counter-narratives of falsity and no
harm, and have ways to counteract them. The belief that children cannot
be reliable witnesses is belied by the research.243 Awareness and use of
already developed, improved interviewing techniques for child victim-
witnesses can eliminate or at least diminish the easy dismissal of the
credibility of children's testimony.2 44 We also should ensure that those
involved understand child development and treat children in age-
appropriate ways. Noting patterns in each jurisdiction that aid in success-
ful prosecution or disposition of cases can also provide some baseline for
establishing narrative credibility.
Using flexible responses to sexual abuse cases is also important. If re-
sort to criminal law hardens opposition to sexual abuse claims, then crea-
tive use of dependency and neglect law provides an avenue of hope; if that
is foreclosed, then other alternatives should be developed through legisla-
tion and education of those working in the fields of criminal law and child
protection. 245 As things presently stand in many jurisdictions, cases go
unaddressed or languish, caught between the conflicting demands and
agendas of dependency, family law, and criminal courts and lawyers.2 46
As many have recommended, 247 coordination and communication of ef-
forts to protect children and deal with offenders across jurisdictions need
242 Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, supra
note 228, at 48.
243 See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
244 Ceci & Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness, supra note 133, at 433; Besharov,
supra note 187, at 135, 147-151.
245 Although the authors of one book on the issue of sexual abuse and child custody argue
that the problem of sexual abuse be redefined as a public health issue and the matter be
removed entirely from the jurisdiction of the courts, such a recommendation overlooks a
number of problems, including Constitutional issues regarding parental rights. And placing
trust in social workers or public health officials will likely reproduce any of the same pa-
thologies that exist currently, including narratives that deny or blame victims. See Rosen &
Etlin, supra note 76, at 193-210.
246 See generally California Child Victim Witness Judicial Advisory Committee Final Re-
port (1988); John E.B. Meyers, Adjudication of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 4 The Future of
Children 84, 96-97 (1994).
247 See, e.g., California Child Victim Witness Judicial Advisory Committee Final Report,
supra note 246; Meyers, supra note 246.
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to be increased. Coordination would eliminate some of these difficulties
and would undoubtedly be better for the children involved.
Finally, all who seek to use law to combat child sexual abuse must
face their own fears, biases, and comforting narratives about sexual abuse
and children. This cannot be accomplished all at once, but recognition of
the uncertainty and emotionality the subject entails is vital to developing
narratives to support legal action. Otherwise, we run the risk of immedi-
ately imposing a pre-existing meta-narrative or understanding on any evi-
dence we gather and any stories we hear. Pure objectivity is not possible
or even desirable in this field, but we must avoid our own distortions and
resistances to the greatest extent possible. We need to be equally aware of
the problems our own moral outrage can create, problems that manifest
themselves in the inept handling of interviews and the poor judgment of
those investigating and prosecuting the McMartin and Michaels cases.
Anger and outrage are normal reactions, but they must be channeled pro-
ductively. If we accomplish even some of these tasks, we can slowly
overcome the current difficulties and impasses these cases exemplify.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a law-driven culture such as ours, if something is not provable in
court, it does not exist as a cognizable harm. The difficulties in proving
cases of child sexual abuse in a context of epistemological instability has
led to a reversion to denial that the crime exists at any significant level,
that harm occurs, or that anyone ought to be concerned about it. The les-
sons we can draw from the past decade's experiences with child sexual
abuse cases and research ought to caution us against resorting to existing
legal frameworks when there is no accepted account for the harm in-
volved. Yet slipping back into comfortable denial, as appealing as it may
be, is unjustifiable.
We need desperately to overcome the efforts to let abuse go unad-
dressed by the legal system, and resist the campaign to discount or sub-
merge these criminal acts. We have so few tools, and those tools that we
do have can be erased by criminal law's demand for objectivity and con-
ventionalism. Against such resistance, what can we do? We listen. We
continue to develop knowledge so that we can deploy the law usefully.
Until we gather more stories, and know more truths, these cases will
remain extraordinarily difficult for all involved. We have sought to deny
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the narrative of sexual abuse at every turn. Yet the voices keep trying.
They undoubtedly have for centuries, but now they have some small grip
on public and legal consciousness. We must not let them go unheeded.
